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The Governance Function of 
Constitutional Property 
Lynda L. Butler* 
Contemporary takings scholarship has devoted much attention to the 
problem of regulatory takings and has largely assumed that physical 
takings are resolved under a clear but simplistic per se rule. Under that 
rule, modern courts automatically find a physical taking whenever 
government action causes a permanent physical invasion of property, 
regardless of the context or the importance of the public interest. Applying 
this bright-line rule has proved to be difficult because it ignores the 
nuances of physical takings situations and the complexities of modern 
property arrangements. Should the physical takings concept apply to a 
rent control law that limits the ability of landlords to exclude tenants, to 
temporary but deliberate breaches of a levee to handle rising waters, or to 
a law that forces landowners to accept an energy company’s underground 
drilling of shale deposits? 
This Article examines early and recent physical takings cases in light of 
modern property theory to demonstrate the grayness of many physical 
takings situations and to show how modern property theory could more 
effectively address them. A visual representation of the Court’s physical 
takings cases, developed from the results and logic of key cases, reveals the 
insufficiency of the Court’s analysis and suggests the need for more 
nuanced thinking. This more nuanced approach draws from modern 
property theory to examine physical takings claims not only under the 
traditional exclusion-based view of property but also from a governance 
perspective. Instead of deciding whether a government action subject to a 
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physical takings claim is more like a permanent occupation violating the 
owner’s right to exclude than a temporary trespass, courts should ask 
whether the exclusion or the governance strategy more effectively manages 
the private and public interests at stake. Casting the resolution of physical 
takings conflicts as a choice between the exclusion and governance 
strategies — instead of as a choice between temporary versus permanent, 
direct versus indirect, or continuous versus occasional — provides greater 
analytical capacity for resolving physical takings claims. Complex 
physical takings situations require a deeper analysis than that provided by 
the Court’s approach. Those situations arise when the dispute involves an 
imminent public crisis, a resource subject to a complex property sharing 
arrangement, a resource needing more management because of overuse or 
changing natural conditions, or a resource subject to a new use made 
possible by a technological advance. The modern Court has overlooked 
this governance function in defining the reach of constitutional property 
under the Takings Clause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Early on, courts agreed that the constitutional guarantee of just 
compensation applied to government action that physically 
appropriated private property even when the government had not 
formally sought condemnation. Eventually, the courts extended this 
physical takings concept to government action that indirectly but 
permanently occupied or invaded private property.1 In addition to 
interfering with the landowner’s expectation of undisturbed dominion 
and control over the land, such government action deprives the owner 
of the ability to control use of the land.2 When government physically 
appropriates or occupies an owner’s property, even unintentionally, 
the owner loses one of the “most essential sticks” in the owner’s 
bundle of property rights: the right to exclude.3 Because of the 
importance of this “essential” stick, modern courts have even 
described a permanent physical occupation as a per se taking, 
automatically requiring compensation regardless of the importance of 
the public interest or the amount of property occupied.4 Takings 
claims involving physical invasions or occupations thus appear, on the 
surface, to involve one of the easiest types of claims to resolve. 
Perhaps because of the modern Court’s simplistic approach, there is 
surprisingly little treatment of physical takings in the academic 
literature. The focus instead has been on regulatory takings. 
Not all physical invasions by government, however, are takings. Nor 
are all damages resulting from a physical invasion recoverable. 
Whether a court will find a compensable physical taking depends on 
the context of the dispute. Permanence of the physical invasion, intent 
to repeat the invasion, actions of the property owner in opening the 
property to third parties, and the directness of the correlation between 
the invasion and the injury can all affect the court’s analysis.5 These 
factors are easy to apply when the physical occupation is direct and 
permanent. They are, however, more difficult to assess when the 
physical invasion is intermittent but recurring, has indirect but 
significant effects on the use and value of the land, or deprives a 
landowner of an important right linked to possession and use of the 
property. Should the physical takings concept apply to a rent control 
 
 1 See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-81 (1871). 
 2 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982). 
 3 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
 4 See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 n.16 (concluding that the size of the physical 
occupation is not determinative). 
 5 See infra Part I. 
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law that restricts the ability of landlords to exclude tenants, to 
temporary but deliberate breaches of a levee to handle rising waters, or 
to a law that forces landowners to accept an energy company’s 
underground drilling of shale deposits (especially without the benefit 
of a neutral, third-party review)? 
The wide variety of government actions challenged as physical 
takings further complicates the takings inquiry. Physical takings 
claims have involved dam construction,6 navigational improvements 
altering water flow7 or raising water levels,8 temporary seizures of 
private property during war,9 and strategic destruction of property to 
stop fires or prevent a war-time enemy from obtaining valuable 
property.10 Physical takings claims have also focused on train 
emissions affecting the use of nearby property,11 low-level airplane 
flights,12 installation of cable equipment,13 public use of shorelands,14 
and regulations that limit the right to exclude.15 The nature of the 
government-related interference has varied widely in terms of its 
directness, permanence, and impact on possessory rights.16 Because of 
the broad range of government actions and degrees of government 
interference, application of the per se rule has produced confusing and 
somewhat inconsistent results. This seemingly simple and clear rule is 
 
 6 See Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 167. 
 7 See Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 217-19 (1904). 
 8 See United States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 800-01 (1950); 
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 499-500 (1945); United States 
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 446-47 (1903), overruled in part by United States v. Chi., 
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 597-98 (1941). 
 9 See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 374-75 (1945); United 
States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 627-28 (1871). 
 10 See United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 150-51 (1952); United 
States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 228-29 (1887). 
 11 See Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 548-49 (1914). 
 12 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946). 
 13 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). 
 14 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987). 
 15 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421. 
 16 The claims have involved direct and permanent physical occupations, indirect 
and permanent physical occupations, indirect and temporary physical occupations 
occurring a single time, indirect and temporary but inevitably recurring physical 
occupations, indirect and temporary physical occupations occurring more than once, 
government acts temporarily depriving a landowner of access without a physical 
invasion, and regulatory acts depriving a landowner of a right important to possession 
or use. See infra Part I (discussing the numerous combinations along the continuums 
of direct/indirect and permanent/temporary). 
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thus a bad fit for the far more complex and nuanced contexts found in 
the real world. 
This Article examines the principles governing physical takings that 
do not involve formal condemnations to determine whether those 
principles provide effective guidance to courts, governments, and 
property owners operating in a world of changing technology and 
resource conditions. It argues that defining physical takings by bright-
line rules artificially defines the scope of this constitutional property 
concept, leads to sometimes irrational line-drawing, and ignores the 
complexity of physical takings. As a consequence, attention is diverted 
from the existence of conflicting right holders, from the impact of 
property use on shared or common systems, and from the nature of 
the property concept, including the relativity of property rights. 
Modern courts have largely ignored or forgotten the complexity of the 
physical takings concept, perhaps because of misconceptions or 
misdirections created by the per se approach, which inaccurately 
signals a simplistic concept contradicted by real-world applications. 
Modern jurists have disaggregated the takings concept into discrete 
categories of analysis, ignoring overlapping gray areas or differences of 
degree.17 Separating physical takings from regulatory takings 
facilitated the Court’s adoption of a per se rule for physical takings.18 
To the extent that this disaggregation recasts the historical compact 
reflected in the Takings Clause, it distorts the balance between private 
and public property. 
A more effective19 approach expands on modern property theory to 
examine physical takings claims, not only under the exclusion strategy 
for delineating property rights, but also from a governance 
 
 17 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539-40 (2005) (describing 
the Supreme Court’s different standards for physical takings and regulatory takings 
and the distinct, private property rights that they were designed to protect). 
 18 This separation officially occurred in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon when 
Justice Holmes declared a diminution in value that went too far to be functionally 
equivalent to a physical taking. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
412, 414-15 (1922) (focusing on the extent of the diminution and explaining how a 
law making the mining of coal commercially impracticable was “very nearly the 
same . . . as appropriating or destroying it”). With diminution in value now a principal 
factor in regulatory takings cases, the Court could narrow the focus of physical 
takings to physical invasions, no matter how small. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-37 
(declaring a permanent physical occupation to be a physical taking regardless of the 
size of the area invaded). 
 19 By “effective,” I mean fully considering constitutionally protected property 
principles, common law property principles, foundational norms of property, key 
functions of property (allocation, management, and distribution), and the 
complexities of real-world property arrangements. 
  
1692 University of California, Davis [Vol. 48:1687 
perspective. As explained by Henry Smith in his seminal 2002 article, 
the exclusion and governance strategies provide methods for defining 
and allocating property rights, and fall at opposite ends of a 
continuum of methods used to measure the costs of various 
collections of property attributes.20 As used in this Article, the 
strategies provide methods not only for allocating property rights in 
ways that minimize the problem of information costs (as Smith 
proposes) but also for managing the owners, non-owners, and 
resources subject to property rights (whether private or public).21 By 
analyzing whether the exclusion or governance strategy would more 
effectively manage a resource, courts could resolve physical takings 
claims in a way that connects physical takings to the underlying 
property concept while operating in the real world. 
Under the exclusion strategy, decision-making power over a resource 
is allocated to one party, who becomes the gatekeeper and owner, with 
the authority to make decisions about the resource. These gatekeeping 
 
 20 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 454-55 (2002) [hereinafter Exclusion Versus 
Governance]. 
 21 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, 
and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 270-72 (1996) 
(discussing the kinds of resources conducive to public rights management); Carol M. 
Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-13 [hereinafter Rethinking Environmental Controls] (discussing 
public rights management in the context of environmental regulation). Although 
Smith describes governance as one of two strategies for delineating an owner’s rights 
over a resource as against non-owners, he views the exclusion strategy as the default 
approach that provides a platform for occasional application of the governance 
strategy. See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 
1709-10 (2012). But see Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 
DUKE L.J. 1287, 1321-24 (2014) (disagreeing with Smith’s platform approach); see also 
Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Property Rights 
Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2052-58 (2012) (examining how the 
balance of power between the state and the property owner is affected by whether 
formal or informal property rights apply and asserting that formal property rights 
increase the vulnerability of property owners to the state by allowing greater 
imposition of state governance obligations on the owners). Greg Alexander uses the 
term “governance” in yet another “internal” way “to refer solely to the relationship 
between individuals who have a property interest in an asset.” Gregory S. Alexander, 
Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1855 n.3 (2012). Neither Smith’s nor 
Alexander’s approach directly addresses the management responsibilities for the 
resource subject to the property rights. My approach reflects the idea that property 
performs an important management function through the exclusion and governance 
strategies. The exclusion strategy takes a decentralized approach, while the 
governance approach is more complicated, requiring greater intervention by a court or 
other third party. 
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powers would include making decisions about use, transfer, 
monitoring the resource, and protecting the owner’s rights from 
encroachment and interference.22 The exclusion strategy is especially 
effective at promoting socially beneficial outcomes when the resource 
is tangible and can be easily bounded, and the number of potential 
users or right holders is large. With a simple delegation of gatekeeping 
power, the delegate becomes the owner of the resource, generally free 
to make decisions about the resource with minimal judicial 
intervention, and responsible for any gains or losses that flow from the 
decisions. This decentralized strategy often provides a low-cost way to 
delineate rights in the resource. 
By contrast, the governance strategy involves a more complicated 
and detailed set of rules and norms. Greater specificity of practices and 
monitoring of use activities may be needed to minimize the costs of 
using a resource that is shared or subject to multiple users and right 
holders.23 The governance strategy can be especially effective at 
delineating rights when the resource is intangible or otherwise not 
easily bounded, is in need of stricter monitoring, or is subject to a 
relatively small class of users. 
Instead of deciding whether a government action subject to a 
physical takings claim is more like a permanent occupation violating 
an owner’s right to exclude than like a temporary trespass, courts 
should ask whether the exclusion or the governance strategy would 
more effectively accommodate the private and public interests at stake. 
Seeing the resolution of physical takings conflicts as a choice between 
the exclusion and governance strategies to property management — 
instead of as a choice between temporary versus permanent or direct 
versus indirect — provides more analytical depth for applying the 
concept. Viewing physical takings through the lens of the exclusion 
and governance strategies helps to flush out the nature and complexity 
of the entire property arrangement, not just the rights of the 
gatekeeper owner but also of other stakeholders. This lens helps to tie 
physical takings analysis to the underlying property concept through 
 
 22 See Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 20, at 454-55. Smith 
attributes the gatekeeping metaphor to James Penner. See id. at 454-55, 455 n.3; see 
also J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 74 (1997). Tom Merrill also used the 
“gatekeeper” metaphor in his influential article on the right to exclude. See Thomas 
W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731, 740-41 (1998). 
 23 See Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 20, at 455; see also Steven 
N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 
J.L. & ECON. 49, 64 (1970) (listing resource management strategies according to cost); 
Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls, supra note 21, at 8-13 (discussing public 
rights management strategies). 
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the management function of property.24 Actual conditions are 
examined, including the effect of private rights on natural systems and 
infrastructure vital to all, the existence of public property rights or 
public goods, and the relationship between public and private rights. 
In Part I, the Article begins with a discussion of modern judicial 
perspectives on physical takings and explains how the Court justifies 
and applies the per se approach.25 The comforting clarity of the per se 
rule has caused courts to overlook the complexity of the physical 
takings concept, resulting in some inconsistencies in logic and results. 
In Part II, a review of older physical takings cases shows the 
complexity of the early Court’s physical takings analysis, which did 
not simply involve application of a categorical rule.26 Then the results 
and logic of modern and traditional physical takings cases27 are 
represented graphically for the purpose of studying the decisions for 
consistency and predictability.28 The visual representation reveals the 
insufficiency of the Court’s modern approach to physical takings and 
suggests the need for deeper analysis. This insufficiency is due in part 
to a disconnect between the exclusion strategy underlying the Court’s 
approach and the complexity of certain real-life property arrangements 
that would benefit from analysis under the governance strategy. 
Complex physical takings situations that are better analyzed under the 
governance strategy include conflicts that involve resources subject to 
complex property sharing arrangements, resources needing more 
management because of overuse or changing natural conditions, 
 
 24 See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CAN. 
J.L. & JURIS. 161, 165-69 (1996) (agreeing that the Court overlooks or glosses over the 
property concept in its takings analysis and describing two models of property that 
need to be considered). 
 25 See infra Part I. 
 26 See infra Part II.A. 
 27 Divisions between modern and traditional takings jurisprudence can be traced 
back to the development of the regulatory takings concept — when the Court first 
removed economic impact from physical takings analysis and used that factor to 
recognize a regulatory taking. Scholars and jurists usually credit Justice Holmes’s 
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon with first making the distinction. See 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least 
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking.”); see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of 
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 208-18 (2004) (discussing the 
impact of Mahon). But see J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the 
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 97-106 (1995) (disputing the 
soundness of the Mahon decision). 
 28 See infra Part II.B. Supreme Court cases mentioned in this Article are coded 
based on scales developed from the standards and tests articulated by the Court. 
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resources subject to a new use made possible through a technological 
advance, and imminent public crises. The complexity of the property 
concept should inform physical takings analysis. The Article 
concludes that using a more nuanced approach to physical takings — 
one that does not overlook the governance function of constitutional 
property — will allow courts to deal more consistently with the many 
sizes and shapes of physical takings claims. 
I. MODERN SIMPLICITY 
Modern courts have crystallized the meaning and scope of the 
physical takings concept in a number of ways. In particular, the courts 
have added definiteness to the concept through the development of a 
categorical or per se approach to physical takings. As the Supreme 
Court explained in the 1992 decision Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, certain “discrete categories of regulatory action . . . [are per 
se] compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest 
advanced in support of the restraint.”29 One of those categories 
involves “regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a 
physical ‘invasion’ of his property.”30 Another way contemporary 
courts have added definiteness to the physical takings concept is 
through their clarification of markers or factors identifying a physical 
taking. Critical factors identified by the Supreme Court in recent years 
include the permanence of the physical invasion,31 the loss of the right 
to exclude by a physical act or forced conveyance,32 whether a physical 
invasion is involuntary or forced,33 and the foreseeability of the 
physical invasion.34 Though earlier Supreme Court cases identified 
some of these factors, contemporary decisions have more clearly 
established them as physical takings benchmarks.35 Until the Court’s 
 
 29 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 30 Id.; see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 
245, 252 (1987); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980). 
 31 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 342 (2002). 
 32 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32. 
 33 See Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 252. 
 34 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012) 
(identifying foreseeability as one of the factors to balance in deciding whether a 
temporary act is a temporary taking). 
 35 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-38 
(1982) (interpreting earlier cases as establishing definitive benchmarks for identifying 
when a situation is equivalent to a direct physical appropriation). For further 
discussion of the modern per se narrative, see infra Part I.A. 
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2012 decision in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States,36 
modern courts appeared to consider these benchmarks as part of their 
functional equivalence test for a physical taking.37 The 2012 decision, 
however, described the factors as part of a “complex balancing 
process,” adding considerable confusion to physical takings analysis.38 
One explanation for the more crystallized approach of modern 
courts to the physical takings concept is that the diminution in value 
issues raised in early physical takings cases have now become part of 
regulatory takings analysis. Whereas earlier cases linked diminution in 
value and interference with use to physical takings claims,39 
contemporary cases have treated economic impact as a separate basis 
for a taking.40 The Court first distinguished between physical takings 
and regulatory takings in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon when the 
Court removed diminution in value from the factors discussed in 
earlier physical takings cases and established economic impact as the 
basis of regulatory takings.41 The separation of physical and regulatory 
 
 36 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 511. 
 37 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427-28. 
 38 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 521 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 
435 n.12) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39 See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1924) (finding that 
a government canal could not have caused flooding amounting to a physical taking of 
land because, as a preliminary matter, neither the customary use nor the value of the 
land was impaired subsequent to the canal’s construction); Bedford v. United States, 
192 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1904) (rejecting the contention that a government project 
aimed at preventing erosion of a river’s banks was a physical taking of a riparian 
owner’s property because that implies a right of riparian owners to restrict one 
another’s use of their properties, which would destroy the values of those properties); 
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 468-69 (1903), overruled in part by United States 
v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941) (holding that the 
government’s construction of a dam was a physical taking of land because it resulted 
in the permanent flooding and destruction of the value of a rice plantation); Pumpelly 
v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871) (explaining the inconsistency 
of not finding a physical taking when a government act wholly destroys the value of 
private property just because the property is not affirmatively appropriated for public 
use within the traditional understanding of the Takings Clause). 
 40 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992) (stating 
the standard that a taking occurs when a government regulation deprives a property 
owner of the ability to reap the economic benefits of the property); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying the economic 
impact of a regulation on a property owner as a relevant factor in determining whether 
there has been a taking); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (“To 
make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same 
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.”). 
 41 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-15. Jurists had even discussed the concept of a 
regulatory taking in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., David J. Brewer, Justice, Supreme 
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takings facilitated the development of a per se approach to physical 
takings.42 
Another possible explanation for the more crystallized approach of 
modern courts is that they are engaging in either literal or interpretive 
denial of past judicial approaches. In a “literal denial” situation, a 
court would assert that an earlier decision never took a particular 
position.43 This type of denial appears to have occurred in Arkansas 
Game & Fish Commission. In that case, the Supreme Court denied that 
an earlier 1924 decision really meant to define a physical taking to be 
“the direct result of the [government] structure, and . . . an actual, 
permanent invasion” even though the earlier decision affirmatively 
described these as “necessary” requirements.44 An “interpretive denial” 
situation, on the other hand, exists when a court accepts the rule or 
position of an earlier decision, but then reinterprets its meaning45 — 
often more in line with the current jurists’ views. In the same 2012 
decision, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the 1924 Court’s statement 
about physical takings, noting that “no distinction between permanent 
and temporary flooding was material to the result.”46 Similarly, in the 
 
Court of the United States, Address Delivered Before the Graduating Classes at the Sixty-
Seventh Anniversary of Yale Law School: Protection to Private Property from Public Attack 
11-13 (June 23, 1891), available at http://www.minnesotalegalhistoryproject.org/assets/ 
Brewer%20%20-%20Protection%20Prop%20%281891%29—XX.pdf (arguing that the case 
in equity for compensation when a government regulation deprives a property owner from 
realizing a reasonable profit from the property is as compelling as the case for 
compensation when a government act physically deprives the owner of the use of his 
property); see also Richard A. Epstein, David Josiah Brewer Addresses Yale Law School, 10 
GREEN BAG 2d 483, 483, 487-94 (2007) (discussing Justice Brewer’s address in support of 
protecting property from taxation, eminent domain, and regulation). 
 42 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426. 
 43 STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 7 
(2001); see also KARI MARIE NORGAARD, LIVING IN DENIAL: CLIMATE CHANGE, EMOTIONS, 
AND EVERYDAY LIFE 10 (2011) (using Cohen’s categories of denial to discuss reactions 
to climate change). 
 44 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 520 (2012) 
(quoting Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45 COHEN, supra note 43, at 7-8; see also NORGAARD, supra note 43, at 10. 
 46 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 520. Justice Ginsburg, author of the 
opinion, might not have always felt this way. During oral argument, she questioned 
the Commission’s counsel on the old case’s significance: 
What about this Court’s precedent in . . . the Sanguinetti case, where the 
Court said that . . . it is at least necessary that the overflow constitute a 
permanent invasion of the land amounting to an appropriation, not merely 
an injury, to property? We would have to withdraw or modify that 
statement, would we not, if . . . your argument prevails? 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 511 (No. 11-
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majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Justice 
Scalia recast certain “notion[s]” and “understandings” of takings as 
part of the “historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has 
become part of our constitutional culture.”47 
The crystallization of contemporary judicial thinking on physical 
takings may also be due to a narrow view of constitutional and 
common law property that protects a property owner’s right to 
exclude almost to a fault. Under that view, property ownership 
conveys nearly absolute rights over the owned property because a 
strategy of exclusive rights more effectively promotes individual 
autonomy and social utility.48 Our private property system developed 
at a time when Locke, Blackstone, and other like-minded thinkers had 
considerable influence on the founding fathers and early jurists.49 
Locke maintained that someone who labored over an unowned 
resource deserved to reap the rewards through property rights,50 while 
Blackstone recognized the importance of protecting individual 
autonomy through strong property rights.51 To many of the Founding 
 
597), 2012 WL 4616028 at *4 (emphasis added). The Commission’s counsel took the 
position that the Sanguinetti decision did not turn on the permanent flooding element, 
and the government did not dispute the point. Id. at 4. For another example of a 
questionable interpretation of prior takings cases, see Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013) (recasting the Nollan and Dolan takings 
nexus review almost exclusively in terms of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
and ignoring the physical invasion holding in both cases). 
 47 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992). In Lucas, Justice 
Scalia was justifying the application of the Takings Clause to confiscatory regulations 
depriving a landowner of all economically viable use even though early theorists and 
jurists “did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property.” See id. 
at 1027-29, 1028 n.15. A subsequent decision used the phrase “common, shared 
understandings of permissible limitations” to describe Justice Scalia’s expression of 
takings principles in Lucas. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001). 
 48 See Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 856 (2013) 
[hereinafter The Resilience] (discussing the individual rights vision of property). 
 49 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2; JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END 
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT) AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 15 (J.W. Gough ed., 
Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. 1956) (1690). See generally KEITH THOMAS, MAN AND THE 
NATURAL WORLD: CHANGING ATTITUDES IN ENGLAND 1500–1800 (1983) (describing the 
change in the common perception of humans’ status within the natural order in 
America and England during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries). 
 50 See LOCKE, supra note 49, at 15. 
 51 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *2 (describing the right of property as “that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe”). 
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Fathers, property became the vehicle not only for stimulating 
economic activities but also for protecting individual liberty.52 
Mainstream economics now dominates property theory, explaining 
how private property rights promote an efficient allocation of interests 
in resources and lead to greater social utility.53 Public property rights 
are often viewed as inefficient arrangements in need of privatization.54 
Alternative approaches and norms also tend to be ignored.55 
Gradually, courts are embedding the assumptions, choices, and values 
of economic theory into common law and constitutional property, 
causing common law and constitutional property to become 
intertwined.56 Supreme Court directives have controlled how lower 
courts resolve regulatory takings claims by limiting their consideration 
of common law property principles. The Court, for example, has 
directed lower courts to only look at “background principles” that 
“inhere in the title itself,”57 only evaluate the reasonableness of private 
expectations under the common law of property and nuisance,58 and 
only invoke substantive laws that fairly exist as background 
principles.59 Some Justices would even lock courts in time, allowing 
 
 52 James Madison, for example, linked property rights to an individual’s “opinions 
and free communication of them . . . in the safety and liberty of his person . . . [and] in 
the free use of his faculties.” James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, 
reprinted in MADISON: WRITINGS 516, 516-18 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Library of Am. 1999). 
 53 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 347-48, 350-53 (1967) (explaining that private property ownership leads to 
the internalization of relevant costs that would otherwise be disregarded for purposes 
of valuing property and making use decisions); James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory 
and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 142 (2009) (noting that 
“individual property rights reduce transactions costs”); Carol M. Rose, Evolution of 
Property Rights, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93, 
93-94 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (arguing that a system of private property solves the 
problem of allocating scarce resources by incentivizing individuals to invest and labor 
to acquire the things that they want). 
 54 Demsetz, for example, viewed the evolution of private property rights as a one-
way street, occurring when the costs of public sharing of resources became too high 
compared to the benefits of privatization. See Demsetz, supra note 53, at 347-48. 
 55 See Butler, The Resilience, supra note 48, at 854 (discussing how mainstream 
economics dominates thinking about property rights today, often to the exclusion of 
important alternative views). 
 56 See id. at 854. 
 57 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 58 See id. at 1032, 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the state supreme 
court erred by failing to determine whether the state regulations “must accord with 
the owner’s reasonable expectations”). But see id. at 1061, 1068-69 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the focus on common law principles and the denial of 
traditional legislative power). 
 59 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1334 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
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them to only consider “relevant precedents” governing the regulated 
land as it is “presently found”60 and denying the power of common 
law courts to “change” property rights in response to new conditions 
or circumstances.61 
A discussion of modern judicial narratives of physical takings will 
reveal that the crystallization of the contemporary physical takings 
concept through the per se approach has limited the concept’s 
effectiveness in complex settings. 
A. The Per Se Narrative 
Since the 1982 decision Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., the Court has unequivocally declared that a permanent physical 
occupation or invasion constitutes a taking regardless of the size of the 
area invaded or the importance of the public interest.62 Although the 
Court had, for years, held that a permanent physical appropriation or 
occupation was a physical taking, the earlier decisions were not as 
absolute in declaring this principle, instead analyzing a number of 
factors. The more forceful position taken in Loretto enables the Court 
to limit significantly the role of the public interest in physical takings 
analysis. Further, as the variety of situations raising physical takings 
claims has increased, the limitations of the per se approach have 
become more obvious. Recently, the Court has come full circle, 
adopting a balancing test for certain situations.63 
In Loretto, the Court considered whether state-mandated physical 
occupation of a landlord’s property constituted a compensable taking 
when the occupation was minor but permanent and facilitated tenant 
access to cable.64 Though the previous owner of the apartment 
building had granted permission for the permanent installation of the 
 
dissenting from a denial of certiorari). 
 60 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18. 
 61 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 
702, 722 (2010); Butler, The Resilience, supra note 48, at 862 n.76. Tom Merrill and 
Henry Smith support this view of the limited power of common law courts to change 
property through their interpretation of the numerus clausus concept, which limits 
the forms available for holding property. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, 
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 
YALE L.J. 1, 58 (2000). 
 62 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-37 
(1982); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
 63 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 521-23 (2012) 
(adopting a balancing process for temporary physical invasions). 
 64 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421. 
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cable facilities, the current landlord objected to the installation.65 The 
facilities included a small metal box on the roof and thin cable wires 
running down the side of the building.66 In holding that the minor but 
permanent physical occupation was a compensable taking, the Court 
noted that it had “long considered a physical intrusion by government 
to be a property restriction of an unusually serious character.”67 When 
the physical intrusion reached the “extreme form of a permanent 
physical occupation,” the character of the government action was 
“determinative.”68 In such a setting, the Court could ignore “other 
factors that a court might ordinarily examine”69 and conclude that a 
taking had occurred. The Court stressed that any permanent physical 
occupation, even one involving insubstantial amounts of space, would 
uniformly be considered a taking without regard for the importance of 
the public interest at stake or the economic impact of the invasion.70 
In justifying its conclusion that a permanent physical occupation 
was always a taking, the Court stressed that such an invasion involves 
the “most serious form of invasion . . . . [I]t chops through the bundle, 
taking a slice of every strand” of the bundle of property rights.71 Those 
strands include the rights to possess, use, and dispose of the invaded 
area and, most importantly, the right to exclude.72 Describing the 
power to exclude as “one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s 
bundle of property rights,”73 the Court noted that a permanent 
physical occupation “forever denies the owner any power to control 
the use of the property.”74 Indeed, the owner could not even make a 
nonpossessory use of the occupied land.75 Property law “has long 
protected an owner’s expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed 
at least in the possession of his property.”76 A permanent physical 
occupation is “qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of 
 
 65 Id. at 421-22, 424. 
 66 Id. at 422. 
 67 Id. at 426. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 432. 
 70 See id. at 430, 434-35. One scholar has concluded that the result in Loretto can 
only be reconciled with other cases that find no taking, despite much more severe 
impacts, by focusing on the “degree of stringency” with which particular property 
rights are protected. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 24, at 175, 186-87. 
 71 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. 
 72 See id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 436. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
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property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the 
owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, 
or nature of the invasion.”77 An owner thus “suffers a special kind of 
injury” whenever government directly invades and occupies the 
owner’s land.78 In the language of modern property theory, the 
permanent loss of the owner’s gatekeeping powers over the occupied 
land necessitates compensation under the Takings Clause. 
The Court in Loretto limited its decision in two important ways. The 
Court first “narrow[ed]”79 its holding by distinguishing the Loretto 
situation from those cases involving regulation of housing and the 
landlord-tenant relationship that did not authorize a “permanent 
occupation of the . . . property by a third party.”80 The regulated 
conduct involved in these cases included discrimination in public 
accommodations, fire regulation, rent control, mortgage moratoria, 
and emergency housing.81 As the Loretto Court explained, its holding 
would not affect the analysis in the regulatory cases because the laws 
at issue in those cases did not require owners “to suffer the physical 
occupation” of their property by a third party.82 The holding thus 
would not impact laws requiring landowners to comply with building 
codes or provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, and 
other similar items. As long as these types of laws did not subject the 
owner to a permanent physical occupation, the “multifactor inquiry 
generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity” would 
apply — and not the per se approach.83 
The Court also limited its decision in Loretto through its affirmation 
of two earlier cases that did not apply a per se approach to temporary 
physical occupations. One of those cases, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
involved a takings challenge to the government’s imposition of a 
navigational servitude on a privately owned pond after the owner 
connected the pond to navigable waters and created a marina.84 In 
concluding that the government action was a taking, the Court in 
Kaiser Aetna relied on a number of factors.85 Recognizing as legitimate 
the government’s power to regulate the pond after it became navigable, 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 441. 
 80 Id. at 440. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See id. 
 84 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 164 (1979). 
 85 See id. at 178. 
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the Kaiser Aetna Court nevertheless concluded that forcing the 
landowner to grant a public right of access to the improved pond far 
exceeded ordinary regulations adopted to facilitate navigation.86 
Because the imposition of the navigational servitude resulted in an 
actual physical invasion causing the loss of the fundamental right to 
exclude, the Court decided that just compensation was owed.87 In 
reaffirming the Kaiser Aetna ruling, the Court in Loretto, however, 
acknowledged that the physical invasion in Kaiser Aetna involved an 
easement of passage and therefore was not a permanent occupation 
subject to the per se rule.88 Rather, a temporary physical invasion — 
one that did not permanently and absolutely divest the landowner of 
the right to exclude — was subject to a “more complex balancing 
process to determine” whether a taking existed.89 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the other case affirmed in 
Loretto, involved a state law requiring shopping center owners to allow 
individuals to exercise their free speech and petition rights on the 
owners’ property.90 Concluding that the requirement did not 
constitute a taking, the Court in PruneYard stressed that the 
landowner could still control the expressive activities by imposing 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to minimize 
interference with the landowner’s business interests.91 Also important 
to the Court was the fact that the landowner had partially waived its 
right to exclude by inviting the general public onto the property.92 As 
the Loretto Court further explained in discussing PruneYard: “Since 
the invasion was temporary and limited in nature, and since the owner 
had not exhibited an interest in excluding all persons from his 
property,” the existence of a physical invasion could not be viewed as 
“determinative.”93 
Collectively, Kaiser Aetna, PruneYard, and Loretto demonstrate that 
contemporary jurisprudence has treated permanent physical 
occupations differently from temporary invasions and nonpossessory 
 
 86 See id. at 172-73. 
 87 See id. at 179-80. 
 88 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433. 
 89 Id. at 435 n.12. 
 90 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76 (1980). 
 91 Id. at 83. 
 92 See id. at 87. 
 93 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Plager of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has described temporary physical 
interference too fleeting to rise to the level of a physical taking as “a momentary 
excursion shortly to be withdrawn, and thus little more than a trespass.” Hendler v. 
United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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restrictions on the right to exclude. Permanent physical occupations 
merit a per se rule because the “permanence and absolute exclusivity 
of [the] physical occupation distinguish it from [a] temporary 
[invasion].”94 Temporary limitations or invasions are subject to a 
“more complex balancing process to determine whether they are a 
taking.”95 According to the Loretto Court, the reason is “evident: they 
do not absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and 
exclude others from, his property.”96 That is, “[n]ot every physical 
invasion is a taking.”97 
Contemporary thinking about permanent physical occupations 
would benefit from the perspective of the governance, as well as the 
exclusion, strategy. With its focus on permanent physical ouster, the 
Loretto decision clearly reflects the exclusion strategy. The permanent 
loss of possession of the occupied area deprives the owner of her 
gatekeeping powers that are important under the exclusion strategy. 
What is missing from the analysis, however, is consideration of the 
legitimate rights of the tenants, especially their First Amendment 
interests in receiving information and news in a timely manner 
through modern means of communication.98 A governance perspective 
would have focused attention on the interests of the tenants, who also 
have possessory rights affected, at least qualitatively, by the landlord’s 
refusal. The result of the analysis may ultimately have been the same, 
given the government’s management method of forced occupation, but 
at least the analysis would have focused attention on the landlord’s 
refusal in light of the tenants’ interests and suggested alternative ways 
to manage the interests. The problem here, in other words, is not 
simply that the landlord suffered a loss of the right to exclude, but also 
that the tenants’ possessory interests in use and enjoyment of the 
leasehold premises are detrimentally affected by the landlord’s 
unilateral decision. When multiple parties have property rights in a 
 
 94 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (applying a governance 
strategy to resolve a trespass dispute). In that case, a field worker and an attorney 
from a nonprofit organization that assisted migrant farmworkers were convicted under 
a New Jersey trespass statute after they visited the on-site living quarters of migrant 
workers without the employer’s supervision or consent. Id. at 299-301. Noting that 
“[p]roperty rights serve human values,” the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction, holding that the migrant workers’ right to access aid provided them by the 
government trumped the employer’s right to exclude. Id. at 303, 307. 
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resource, courts need to consider a governance strategy of 
management. 
The Kaiser Aetna decision also reflects exclusionary thinking, with 
the Court trying to decide where to place the forced easement of 
passage on the continuum of temporary trespass to permanent 
occupation.99 As Loretto explained in its examination of Kaiser Aetna, 
the Court refused to apply a per se approach in Kaiser Aetna because 
of the temporary and limited nature of passage but nevertheless found 
a physical taking due to the loss of the right to exclude — a 
fundamental gatekeeping power.100 A governance perspective would 
have more fully highlighted that navigable waters are subject to public 
and private rights and that those rights sometimes carry conflicting 
management responsibilities. As inherently public property, navigable 
waters are important public resources contributing to commerce, 
travel, and economic well-being.101 As resources subject to the private 
rights of waterfront landowners, navigable waters provide important 
and valuable benefits of access and use to those landowners.102 
Management of public resources subject to public and private property 
rights will necessarily involve government regulation as well as private 
action. The exclusion strategy is, however, designed to focus on the 
powers of an individual owner or party. Without consideration of the 
governance strategy, the analysis of a conflict tends to be linear instead 
of multi-dimensional. Left out of the equation are the management 
powers of conflicting rightholders and the complex nature of property 
arrangements involving public and private rights. When a 
management decision by one of the rightholders produces unnecessary 
spillovers or substantially interferes with the reasonable expectations 
of other rightholders, a governance strategy would call for a 
rebalancing of rights and responsibilities.103 Applying a governance 
 
 99 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979). 
 100 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178-79. 
 101 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 750-55 (1986) [hereinafter The Comedy of the 
Commons] (describing timeless traditions of using navigable waters for public 
transportation and recreation). 
 102 Though the water rights of waterfront landowners vary from state to state, they 
typically include the right to wharf out to or access navigable waters and the right to 
use the waters for irrigation, fishing, and consumption. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF 
WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:74, at 132-36 (2013). 
 103 In Kaiser Aetna, for example, government regulators induced the private 
waterfront landowner to invest millions in improvements with the expectation that 
the improved property would remain privately owned and controlled. Kaiser Aetna, 
444 U.S. at 169. Courts traditionally have concluded that private waterfront 
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strategy to Kaiser Aetna would highlight the complex property sharing 
arrangement and recognize that government expanded its 
management powers by misleading the landowner. 
In contrast to Loretto and Kaiser Aetna, the PruneYard decision uses 
exclusionary thinking to conclude that the physical invasion was too 
temporary, too voluntary, too subject to the landowner’s time, place, 
and manner restrictions to be a taking. Because the language of 
exclusion controls the analysis, some have had trouble reconciling the 
decision with other temporary physical invasion cases.104 Analysis 
under a governance strategy would alleviate some of this difficulty. 
That analysis would recognize the public dimension of private 
property opened to the public and the resulting need to manage both 
from a public and private perspective. Once the landowner voluntarily 
opens the property to public use, the owner gives the property a 
public character of sorts and yields some control to the courts to 
consider the interests of public users in resolving a conflict. 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court 
expanded the scope of the per se rule by redefining a permanent 
physical occupation to include a “permanent and continuous right” of 
passage.105 In Nollan, the owners of beachfront property challenged 
the state coastal commission’s decision to condition approval of a 
development permit on their conveyance of an easement that would 
allow the public to pass laterally across their property.106 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Scalia relied on Loretto to bring permanent rights 
of passage within the per se rule.107 Absent from his discussion was 
any acknowledgement that Loretto had classified an easement of 
passage as a temporary physical invasion not subject to the per se rule 
and had stressed the need to have a permanent dispossession of the 
right to exclude, use, or dispose of property.108 Despite Loretto’s focus 
on the “permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation” 
in defining the scope of the per se rule, the majority in Nollan 
 
landowners hold their rights subject to the navigational servitude and to legitimate 
government action that promotes navigation. Under this view landowners often are 
not entitled to just compensation. See, e.g., TARLOCK, supra note 102, § 9:17, at 553 
(discussing the scope of the navigational servitude and the Supreme Court cases that 
defined it). 
 104 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard 
v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 51 (1997) (arguing that the decision “fundamentally 
misunderstands the logic of property rights”). 
 105 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987). 
 106 See id. at 828. 
 107 See id. at 831-32. 
 108 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433-35 (1982). 
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classified the right of passage as a permanent physical occupation.109 
The Court explained that the condition would give individuals “a 
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real 
property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular 
individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the 
premises.”110 PruneYard and Kaiser Aetna were not inconsistent with 
this conclusion because, according to the Nollan Court, neither 
involved a “classic right-of-way easement.”111 Traditional doctrines 
governing the navigation servitude affected the analysis in Kaiser 
Aetna, while the owner in PruneYard already had opened the land to 
the general public.112 
Although the Court in Nollan expanded the scope of the per se rule 
by broadening the meaning of permanent physical occupation, the 
Court also limited applicability of the rule. A literal interpretation 
arguably would allow landowners to win a per se taking challenge any 
time the government imposed a condition in a permitting process that 
met this expanded meaning. Such an interpretation would require a 
taking to be found, for example, when government required a 
subdivision developer to build roads or playgrounds to meet increased 
demand associated with the subdivision.113 The Court in Nollan 
rejected this literal interpretation, instead holding that a permit 
condition resulting in a physical occupation could still be 
constitutional if a permit denial would not be a taking and the permit 
condition served the same legitimate police power purpose as the 
denial.114 If, however, this essential nexus did not exist, such a 
 
 109 Compare id. at 435 n.12 (stressing the need to determine whether a physical 
invasion completely precludes the owner’s use of the property or is only a temporary 
use), with Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832 (finding a taking where, although an owner is not 
physically prevented from using land, he or she is stripped of the right to exclude 
others from passing over it). 
 110 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832. 
 111 Id. at 832 n.1. 
 112 See id. 
 113 JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
CONTROL LAW 421 (1998). 
 114 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. The Court’s 2013 decision in Koontz v. St. Johns 
River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595-96 (2013), calls this analysis 
into question. In that decision the Court clarified that the takings nexus reviews of 
Nollan and its companion case, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), even 
apply to permit denials when the denial follows the applicant’s refusal to meet a 
condition. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595-96. In the process, the Koontz Court seemed 
to fold its takings nexus analysis more completely into its unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine. See id. 
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condition would be an “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”115 Although 
the nexus did not exist in Nollan, the Court’s restriction of the 
applicability of the per se rule “rescued many land use controls.”116 
Fifteen years later, the Court appeared to ignore the Nollan 
expansion of the per se rule when it explained the physical takings 
concept in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency.117 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens described 
the jurisprudence governing physical takings as involving “the 
straightforward application of per se rules.”118 Those rules mandated 
compensation whenever “government physically takes possession of 
an interest in property for some public purpose” regardless of the 
importance of the public interest, the amount taken, or the temporary 
nature of the use.119 The Court focused on the deprivation of 
possession and the physical occupation of property; references to 
Nollan were noticeably absent.120 This apparent slight became more 
confusing after a 2012 Supreme Court decision appeared to retreat 
somewhat from the per se approach for temporary invasions.121 
 
 115 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 
A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 421. 
 117 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002). But see Andrea L. Peterson, The False Dichotomy Between Physical and 
Regulatory Takings Analysis: A Critique of Tahoe-Sierra’s Distinction Between Physical 
and Regulatory Takings, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381, 440-41 (2007) (interpreting Stevens 
more broadly as not limiting physical takings to permanent physical occupations). 
 118 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See id. at 321-23. The Court does, however, cite United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946), as an example of a per se taking involving government use of 
“private airspace to approach a government airport.” Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 
U.S. at 322. What the reference ignores is the damage caused by low-level flights over 
the landowner’s property. Compare id. (implying that the determinative factor for 
finding a taking in Causby was that the government planes actually flew over the 
land), with Causby, 328 U.S. at 262-63 (finding a taking because the noise of large 
aircraft passing just overhead with regular frequency was so disruptive as to render 
the land useless). The characterization of the airspace as private also is inconsistent 
with current thinking on airspace as a resource subject to public and private interests. 
See Note, Airplane Noise, Property Rights, and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 
1428 (1965) (discussing landowners’ shrinking ownership interests in the sky). 
 121 In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, the Court concluded that 
a temporary physical invasion required “a more complex balancing process,” rather 
than a per se approach. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 
521 (2012) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
435 n.12 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Factors to be balanced include 
the duration of the flooding, the character of the land, whether the invasion was 
intentional or foreseeable, and the severity of the interference. 
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The per se narrative announced in Loretto and other decisions 
presents a “straightforward” rule that ignores the complexity of 
physical takings. Because of this complexity, the scope of the per se 
rule shifts in meaning as new situations and forms of interference 
arise. Though the rule professes clarity, its application negates the 
assumption of simplicity. The rule assumes that all physical invasions 
are alike. It assumes that if “A” — a physical invasion — exists, then 
“B” — a physical taking — must be found. What is left out of the 
analysis is the continuum of physical invasion situations that actually 
exist, from outright and unjustified physical intrusions onto private 
property to physical interference affecting shared resources. Instead of 
the hypothesis being A, it really is A1 or A2 or A3 (and so on). The per 
se narrative also fails to understand the reach of the management role 
of property, particularly the choice between the exclusion and 
governance strategies of management. This omission ultimately causes 
the Court to come full circle in its thinking about physical takings and 
to retreat in part from the per se approach. The next Subpart will more 
clearly show the continuum of physical invasion situations and the 
limitations of the per se rule. 
B. Limitations of the Per Se Approach 
Limitations of the per se approach become increasingly apparent as 
the physical takings claims move away from the physicality122 or the 
permanence123 of a direct physical appropriation or occupation. 
Difficulties posed by situations involving little or no physicality are 
demonstrated by physical takings challenges to economic regulations 
that limit, in some fashion, the owner’s right to exclude, use, or profit 
from her property. Problems posed by situations that are not 
permanent are exemplified by physical takings claims raised against 
government action that is limited in terms of time or fluid in terms of 
space. Both types of situations are discussed below. 
1. Little or No Physicality 
Laws regulating the price of using, occupying, or profiting from 
another’s property — the rate, the rent, the interest — have been 
 
 122 The physicality of the government interference measures the degree to which 
government action has a physical presence on private property. 
 123 The permanence of the government interference measures the degree to which 
the interference continues indefinitely. 
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challenged as physical takings.124 Though the challenged government 
action does not involve an actual physical occupation, regulated 
property owners have stressed the limiting impact of the law on the 
right to exclude or profit in their arguments in support of a physical 
taking. For the most part, their claims have met with little success. 
Loretto’s narrow construction of a per se physical taking affected the 
results in FCC v. Florida Power Corp.125 and Yee v. City of Escondido,126 
two cases involving regulatory restrictions to the right to exclude. In 
Florida Power Corp., the Court considered whether the Pole 
Attachment Act (“PAA”) authorized a permanent physical occupation 
of private property that fell within the per se takings rule of Loretto. 
The PAA empowered the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”), in the absence of state regulation, to determine “just and 
reasonable” rates that utilities could charge cable systems for using 
utility poles to string television cable.127 This delegation of power 
enabled the FCC to control the utilities’ exploitation of their 
monopoly position by overcharging cable television operators.128 
Several utility companies had argued that the Act prevented them from 
excluding cable companies and thus constituted a taking.129 The Court 
rejected this argument, concluding that “required acquiescence” was 
“at the heart” of Loretto’s physical occupation rule.130 The statute in 
Loretto “specifically required landlords to permit permanent 
occupation of their property by cable companies,” while the PAA did 
not give cable operators “any right to occupy space on utility poles.”131 
The PAA merely authorized the FCC to review rents charged by utility 
landlords who had “voluntarily entered into leases with cable 
 
 124 See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (challenging as a 
physical taking a law forcing the transfer of non-interest-earning client funds into 
interest-earning accounts and the use of the interest earned for indigent legal 
services); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (challenging as a physical 
taking a rent control law that fixed rent and limited a landlord’s ability to terminate 
mobile home pad tenancies); FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987) 
(challenging as a physical taking a law regulating the rate charged by utilities for use 
of their poles). 
 125 Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245. 
 126 503 U.S. 519. 
 127 Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 248 (quoting the Pole Attachments Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 224(b)(1) (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128 See id. at 247-48. 
 129 See id. at 251 n.6. 
 130 Id. at 252. 
 131 Id. at 251. 
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company tenants renting space on utility poles.”132 As long as the 
economic regulation did not “require” the utility landlord to “suffer 
the physical occupation” of its property by a third party, the multi-
factor test generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental 
activities would apply instead of the per se test.133 
In Yee, the Court considered whether a rent control law fixing rent 
for mobile home pads and limiting termination of pad tenancies 
amounted to a physical taking.134 The effect of the law was to allow 
the mobile home tenants to occupy the rental pad at below market 
rental value as long they complied with their lease and the landlord 
continued to use the land for rental purposes.135 This protection from 
eviction was provided in part because of the high cost of moving a 
mobile home.136 The Court in Yee resisted the temptation to give 
Loretto an expansive reading, holding instead that the per se test of 
Loretto did not apply. As the Court explained, the required 
acquiescence at the heart of the physical occupation concept was not 
present in Yee because the mobile home park owners “voluntarily 
rented their land to mobile home owners.”137 The challenged law did 
not compel the mobile home park owners to rent or continue to rent 
their land to mobile home owners.138 “A different case would be 
presented were the statute, on its face or as applied, to compel a 
landowner over objection to rent his property or to refrain in 
 
 132 Id. at 252. 
 133 Id. (original emphasis omitted) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A year 
later, in Pennell v. City of San Jose, the Court decided that the physical takings 
challenge to a rent control law was not ripe for consideration. Pennell v. City of San 
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988). The city ordinance allowed a hearing officer resolving 
tenant challenges to rent increases above 8% to consider hardship to the tenant. See id. 
at 5. In a footnote, the majority made it clear that they saw “no need to reconsider the 
constitutionality of rent control per se” under the physical takings concept. Id. at 12 
n.6. Loretto and Florida Power Corp. had, in their view, resolved that issue. Id. Justices 
Scalia and O’Connor dissented from the lack of ripeness conclusion and would have 
found a taking because of the absence of a causal link between the hardship provision 
and landlords. See id. at 15, 20-24 (Scalia, J., with O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). As Justice Scalia explained, the wealth transfer effected by the 
ordinance unfairly singled out landlords to bear the costs of addressing a social 
problem in violation of the Takings Clause. See id. at 15, 19-23. 
 134 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523-24 (1992). 
 135 See id. at 526-27; JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 421. 
 136 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 524. 
 137 Id. at 527. 
 138 See id. at 527-28. Given California law and regulatory practice, the assertion 
that landlords could get out of the rental business is debatable. See STEVEN J. EAGLE, 
REGULATORY TAKINGS § 4-3(e), at 455 & n.423 (4th ed. 2009). 
  
1712 University of California, Davis [Vol. 48:1687 
perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.”139 Even though the law might 
deprive the owners of the ability to choose incoming tenants or might 
cause a wealth transfer, those effects would not create a physical 
taking. Rather, they would speak to the possible existence of a 
regulatory taking.140 Individuals who “voluntarily open their property 
to occupation by others” could not successfully argue that a law 
depriving them of their ability to exclude particular individuals was a 
per se taking.141 
In Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, the Court considered a 
physical takings challenge to a law requiring the depositing of 
otherwise non-interest-earning client funds into Interest on Lawyers 
Trust Accounts (“IOLTA”) accounts and directing the interest earned 
after depositing to be used to support legal services for the poor.142 
The Court decided to apply the per se physical takings approach to the 
required transfer of interest now earned by the IOLTA accounts, 
explaining that the forced transfer was a taking of private property 
owned by the clients “akin to the occupation of a small amount of 
rooftop space in Loretto.”143 Compensation was not owed, however, 
because the client funds were non-interest-bearing accounts prior to 
being deposited in the IOLTA account. The property owners thus 
suffered no actual loss.144 
The Court’s decision to treat a mandatory transfer of funds as a 
physical taking undermines the decisions reached in the rent control 
and rate regulation cases and suggests that a different result might be 
reached today, especially given the changes in the Court’s 
composition.145 Treating a forced wealth transfer as a physical taking 
 
 139 Yee, 503 U.S. at 528. 
 140 Id. at 530-31. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 220 (2003). 
 143 Id. at 234-35. The Court relied on its decision in Phillips v. Washington Legal 
Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998), to conclude that the interest earned in an 
IOLTA trust account was the property of the clients and customers whose money was 
deposited in the accounts. Brown, 538 U.S. at 235. The Court quickly dismissed the 
argument that a taking arose from the requirement that the principal be placed in an 
IOLTA account, explaining that the mandate simply required a transfer and that no 
adverse economic impact occurred. Id. at 234. 
 144 Brown, 538 U.S. at 235-37. In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that just 
compensation meant the fair market value of the property taken, which would be 
greater than zero. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 145 In Brown, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas 
dissented. Id. at 241-53. With the retirements of Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and 
Souter (all of whom supported the majority decision) and the additions of Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, and Sotomayor, it is likely that the dissent’s 
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blurs the line between physical and regulatory takings, bringing us 
back full circle to the days when physical takings analysis included an 
analysis of impact on use.146 Unfortunately, that circling is more 
troubling now because of the expansion of the physical takings 
concept.147 
2. Decreasing Permanence 
The Court has also extended the physical takings concept to some 
government-authorized uses of a public or shared resource, such as air 
or navigable waters, that harm adjacent property. These types of 
physical takings may be temporary in both a temporal and spatial 
sense, with the use being transient and not geographically fixed. While 
some of the government-authorized uses result in an invasion of 
private property, others do not. They all have an adverse impact on the 
adjacent landowner’s ability to possess, use, or profit from the land. 
One area where this extension of the physical takings concept has 
occurred involves technological advances that blur the distinction 
between trespassory and nontrespassory invasions. In cases involving 
harm caused by low-level airplane flights, for example, the Court 
concluded that a physical taking resulted when government-authorized 
use of the airspace immediately above privately owned land adversely 
affected the owner’s use of the land.148 As the Court in United States v. 
Causby explained, when low-level flights continuously invade the 
airspace adjacent to the land and affect use of the surface, it is “as if the 
United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken 
 
logic would prevail today. 
The Court chose not to address the wealth transfer argument in a 2005 case 
involving challenges to a rent control law governing oil companies. In Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., the law limited the rent that oil companies could charge 
independent dealers leasing company-owned service stations. See Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
O’Connor used the decision to clarify that any requirement that a restriction 
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose was not a stand-alone takings test 
but instead derived from due process jurisprudence. Id. at 531-32. 
 146 See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 179-81 (1871) 
(treating the near total destruction of a property’s use value by government-induced 
overflows as functionally equivalent to a physical taking). 
 147 See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519-20 
(2012) (clarifying that temporary physical invasions could be a physical taking even 
though they were not inevitably recurring). 
 148 See Griggs v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 88-90 (1962); United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262-63 (1946). 
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exclusive possession of it.”149 Even though the flights, if permanently 
occurring, would only constitute an easement of passage, they would, 
in the Court’s words, “be a definite exercise of complete dominion and 
control over the surface of the land.”150 The absence of a direct physical 
invasion onto the land is “irrelevant,” the Court explained, because the 
“owner’s right to possess and exploit the land — that is to say, his 
beneficial ownership of it — would be destroyed.”151 The Court 
stressed, however, that flights over privately owned land normally are 
not a taking — not unless they are “so low and so frequent as to be a 
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the 
land.”152 Such low-level flights fall into “the same category as invasions 
of the surface.”153 Critical to the Court’s analysis was the impact of the 
flights on the use and value of the land below. Thus, in analyzing 
nontrespassory invasions under the physical takings concept, the Court 
applied the same type of functional equivalence logic relied on by the 
Court in prior cases expanding physical takings and in cases 
recognizing the concept of regulatory takings.154 
More recently, the Court muddied the physical takings concept by 
concluding that not all government-authorized physical invasions 
caused by flooding were governed by the per se approach, and that a 
physical taking could indeed be temporary and not necessarily 
recurring. Again, the government used a public resource — navigable 
waters — in a way that harmed adjacent private property. This time 
the government use caused an actual but temporary physical invasion. 
 
 149 Causby, 328 U.S. at 261. 
 150 Id. at 262. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 266. In determining whether the harm to the private property results from 
a direct invasion by government, the Court has distinguished between harm that is 
peculiar to the land in question and harm that is generally felt by the community. See 
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 422. A direct invasion requires harm 
that is suffered by the individual, and not the community at large. When the harm is 
suffered by the community generally and the government act otherwise promotes a 
legitimate police power objective, the Court has considered the harm to be incidental 
to the promotion of the public purpose. See Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 
546, 554, 556-57 (1914). 
 153 Causby, 328 U.S. at 265; accord Griggs, 369 U.S. at 88-90. 
 154 Compare Causby, 328 U.S. at 261-62, 264-66 (citing the flooding cases and 
equating the impact on the owner’s rights to the impact on possession and use of the 
land), with Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329-
30 (1922) (discussing whether the military’s firing of battery guns over the land of 
another imposed a servitude and directly invaded the landowner’s domain), and Pa. 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (discussing whether mining 
regulations that limited the value of a mineral estate rose to the level of a taking). 
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The 2012 decision in question, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. 
United States, involved a physical takings claim brought by Arkansas 
Game and Fish Commission (“the Commission”), owner of a wildlife 
management area that included lands along the banks of the Black 
River.155 The Commission used the area as a hunting and wildlife 
preserve and for timber harvesting.156 In 1948, the Army Corps of 
Engineers had built a dam 115 miles upstream from the Commission’s 
property.157 As part of its water control efforts, the Corps adopted a 
plan that allowed water release rates to vary seasonably and that 
authorized deviations.158 Each year from 1993 through 2000, the 
Corps had approved deviations from the planned release rates, 
lowering them in the fall to provide a longer harvest period for 
downstream farmers and increasing them at other times to deal with 
the accumulated water.159 The Commission claimed that the 
temporary deviations were a physical taking because their cumulative 
impact had destroyed the timber on the Commission’s land and 
substantially changed the character of the land.160 
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims agreed, concluding that the 
temporary deviations over the 1993–2000 period differed noticeably 
from historical flooding patterns, with an increase in the number of 
days and water levels over historical patterns.161 Although the 
substantial increase in flooding was temporary, it constituted a 
physical appropriation of the Commission’s property.162 The Court of 
Federal Claims explained that the cumulative effect of the flooding 
changed the character of the soil, reducing its oxygen content, and 
weakened the trees’ root systems; these changes ultimately destroyed 
the trees and led to the invasion of less desirable species.163 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, interpreting the 
Supreme Court’s standard for physical takings by flooding as requiring 
the flooding to be “permanent or inevitably recurring.”164 
 
 155 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 515 (2012). 
 156 Id. at 515-16. 
 157 Id. at 516. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 607-08, 621-23 
(2009), rev’d, 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 511; see Ark. Game & 
Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 517. 
 162 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 619-21; see Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 
133 S. Ct. at 517. 
 163 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 612-14, 620. 
 164 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 637 F.3d at 1374 (relying on Sanguinetti v. United 
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In an 8–0 decision, the Supreme Court concluded that no blanket 
exemption from takings liability existed for temporary, government-
induced flooding.165 Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg rejected 
the interpretation of the Court’s precedent as restricting physical 
takings by flooding to permanent flooding or to temporary, 
intermittent but inevitably recurring flooding.166 As the Court 
explained, temporary flooding still may oust a landowner from 
possession, as opposed to simply injuring his property,167 or may 
cause “direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use 
of the land.”168 In an apparent departure from recent decisions 
preferring a per se approach to physical takings,169 the Court relied on 
a footnote in Loretto, a non-flooding case, to announce that temporary 
invasions required “a more complex balancing process.”170 Factors 
identified by the Court as important to that balancing included: the 
duration of the flooding (where the Court cited cases dealing with 
both temporary physical invasions and regulatory restrictions); the 
degree to which the invasion was intended or foreseeable; the 
character of the land (where the Court discussed whether the land was 
already in a floodplain); reasonable investment-backed expectations 
about use (where the Court mentioned past flooding); and the severity 
of the interference (where a parenthetical pointed to the repetitive 
nature of the interference, not to its economic impact).171 
 
States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924)). 
 165 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519. 
 166 Id. at 519-21. 
 167 Id. at 518-19. 
 168 Id. at 519 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S 256, 266 (1946)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 169 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (referring to the “straightforward application of per se rules” for 
physical takings); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992) 
(noting that the categorical approach applies in general to physical invasions, at least 
when they are permanent, and to regulations denying all economically viable use). 
 170 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 521 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the statement in 
Loretto about a balancing process). 
 171 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522-23. One scholar has argued that 
the Court’s factors alter the ad hoc factor-balancing test first defined by the Court in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See 
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Takings Case Set for Oral Argument at the SCOTUS on January 
15th, ENVTL. LAW PROF BLOG (Jan. 13, 2013), http://perma.cc/6EM9-7M25 [hereinafter 
Takings Case Set]. 
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The principle that Arkansas Game & Fish Commission establishes 
may lead us down a troubling path with unexpected consequences — 
a path that could have been avoided had the decision focused on the 
complex property sharing arrangement at issue. After the 2012 
decision, whenever government releases water from a dam, levee, or 
other water improvement project, downstream owners of property 
damaged by the release are more likely to sue — regardless of the 
reasons for the release or the temporariness of the flooding.172 If, for 
example, a government-authorized structure fails to hold rising waters 
— for whatever reason — downstream landowners significantly 
harmed by the flooding will probably bring suit, citing Arkansas Game 
& Fish Commission as support.173 Or, if government attempts to deal 
with rising floodwaters by deliberately breaching a levee or dam, 
landowners significantly harmed by breach will likely sue, convinced 
of the strength of their claim by Arkansas Game & Fish Commission.174 
Recent courts’ handling of these types of claims even suggest the 
possibility of perverted results, with government negligence or failure 
to act being rewarded over affirmative government efforts to deal with 
a serious flooding problem.175 As climate change worsens, sea level 
rises, and extreme rain events become more likely in certain parts of 
 
 172 See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Temporary Takings, More or Less, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 461, 466 
(Randall S. Abate ed., 2015); Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Some Advice About 
“Takings,” SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 4, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2012/12/opinion-analysis-some-advice-about-takings/. If government-induced flooding 
were inevitably recurring or even likely to recur, condemnation of a flowage easement 
for floodwaters might be necessary. Changing and unpredictable weather patterns, 
however, might make forecasting future flooding events difficult. Thus, the reason for 
the decision to release floodwaters should be a critical part of the physical takings 
analysis. A governance strategy would allow such consideration. 
 173 See, e.g., Murphy v. Village of Plainfield, 918 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (N.D. Ill. 
2013) (recognizing Arkansas Game & Fish Commission as abrogating Sanguinetti, but 
rejecting the takings claim on ripeness grounds); Henderson v. City of Columbus, 827 
N.W.2d 486, 493-97 (Neb. 2013) (declining to extend the takings principles of 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission to a one-time basement flooding event). 
 174 See, e.g., Quebedeaux v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 317 (2013) (denying the 
government’s motion to dismiss a claim based on a one-time flooding event, relying 
on the multi-factor test of Arkansas Game & Fish Commission). 
 175 Compare id. at 323-24 (rejecting the argument that a single flooding event 
resulting from the deliberate opening of a spillway to prevent downstream flooding 
could not be a physical taking), with Henderson, 827 N.W.2d at 494-97 (concluding 
that a backup of the City’s sewage system after a heavy rainstorm was not a taking 
under Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, even if due to a malfunctioning system, 
without proof that the backup was foreseeable or intentionally caused). 
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the country,176 these types of results place government in an 
impossible situation. 
The potential damage done by the reasoning in Arkansas Game & 
Fish Commission results, in part, from the Court’s failure to consider 
background principles of property law — here state water law — in 
developing its reasoning and evaluating the rights and reasonable use 
expectations of downstream owners. The rights of waterfront 
landowners are relative, depending on their position as upstream or 
downstream landowners.177 While each riparian owner generally has 
the right to reasonable use of the adjoining watercourse, the scope of 
downstream use rights is relative to and dependent on the reasonable 
uses occurring upstream.178 The conditions facing a downstream 
rightholder will necessarily differ from those facing upstream users. 
This concept of relativity of upstream and downstream uses is 
inherent in and part of the definition of riparian rights.179 Though the 
importance of the role of state water law was raised in amicus curiae 
filed before the Court,180 it apparently was not adequately discussed in 
the parties’ briefs or considered by the Federal Circuit, and therefore 
was not pursued by the Court.181 Yet, state water law principles are 
relevant to an analysis of downstream owners’ rights and reasonable 
expectations. While the bottom line in Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission probably would have been the same given the repeated 
nature of the government’s water releases, inclusion of the analysis 
would have helped to minimize the filing of future frivolous lawsuits 
and the creation of perverse incentives. 
Consideration of downstream versus upstream status, and of water 
law more generally, also highlights the need to understand the 
property arrangement governing use of navigable waters. Effective 
 
 176 See generally WORKING GROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 4, CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
(IPCC) (2013) [hereinafter IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at http://www. 
climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf (reporting on the 
science and impacts of climate change). 
 177 See TARLOCK, supra note 102, §§ 3:56, 3:60, at 102, 107 (discussing the 
traditional and modern judicial doctrines for allocating riparian rights). 
 178 See id. § 3:56, at 102. 
 179 See id. § 3:55, at 107. 
 180 Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief of Professors of Law Teaching in 
the Property Law & Water Rights Fields and Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 3, Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012) 
(No. 11-597), 2012 WL 3875238, at *3. 
 181 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522 & n.1. 
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resolution of the physical takings question requires an understanding 
of the affected property rights in the context of the affected resources. 
Approaching the physical takings question simply from the 
perspective of the exclusion strategy fails to appreciate the complexity 
of the interests at stake and of the resources subject to those interests. 
It fails to appreciate the need to manage shared resources, such as air 
and water, to promote the private and public rights in those resources. 
The management question is not simply about whether government 
action physically affected private property but also about whether 
government action legitimately managed the shared resource to 
promote both public and private interests. Such management efforts 
sometimes will require making a choice between truly conflicting and 
incompatible uses.182 Using a governance strategy to resolve the 
conflict would ensure consideration of competing interests and 
encourage more active review of conflicts by courts or regulators. 
In the case of Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, the decision to 
allow deviations in water releases to favor downstream farmers over 
another user whose property would be subject to significantly 
increased flooding183 was not the type of choice needed to manage the 
resource effectively. The government created the conflict by slowing 
the release of water to extend the growing season of downstream 
farmers and then releasing the accumulated water later. This action, in 
effect, forced a reallocation of water rights to promote the preferences 
of one group of rightholders. In the case of an infrastructure failure or 
a deliberate breach to deal with rising floodwaters, the government 
would not be creating a conflict to prefer one user over another but 
rather would be addressing a resource problem. The government must 
be able to make management decisions, including experimentation 
with different options, to deal with natural conditions and disasters 
without being subjected to takings liability for lands damaged as a 
result. The Arkansas Game & Fish Commission decision makes such a 
management approach more costly, because of increased takings 
litigation, and thus less likely. 
Finally, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission seems to bring takings 
jurisprudence full circle, merging the physical takings and regulatory 
takings concepts more like the traditional courts did. The Court, for 
 
 182 The Court has recognized the validity of police power action that chooses 
between conflicting uses. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-81 (1928) 
(upholding the Virginia Cedar Rust Act by choosing the apple tree owners over the red 
cedar tree owners to combat cedar rust). But see EAGLE, supra note 138, § 6-5(a), at 
690-91 (describing the decision as based on wealth maximization, not conflicting uses). 
 183 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 516. 
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example, mixed physical and regulatory takings in explaining how 
government interference temporary in duration could be a taking — 
moving from outright physical occupations temporary in duration to 
direct but temporary interference caused by government-induced 
action to temporary land use regulations.184 Then, in describing the 
balancing test that would apply instead of the per se approach, the 
Court discussed the test in light of temporary physical invasions and 
regulations that only partially diminished the property’s value. 
Though the Court began with the balancing inquiry defined in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Court recast or 
ignored old factors and mixed in new ones.185 This recasting conflicts 
with earlier cases describing the “multifactor inquiry” as “generally 
applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity.”186 
The discussion of the limitations of the per se approach to physical 
takings reveals the Court’s failure to recognize the wide variety of 
situations raising the claim. Those situations range from direct, 
permanent physical invasions to complex property sharing 
arrangements involving interactions among public and private right 
holders. A review of traditional physical takings cases in the next 
section shows how earlier courts recognized the context dependency 
of the physical takings concept. Application of modern property 
theory to traditional and modern physical takings cases then 
underscores the importance of the governance function in analyzing 
more complex constitutional property claims. 
 
 184 See id. at 519 (citing Causby, Dickinson, and Tahoe-Sierra). 
 185 See id. at 518 (mentioning the “situation-specific factual inquiries” often 
involved in takings cases); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 
124-25 (1978) (identifying the character of the government action, the diminution in 
value, and interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations as factors to 
consider); Mulvaney, Takings Case Set, supra note 171 (discussing the impact of 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission on the Penn Central balancing test). The Court in 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission adds intent or foreseeability and appears to recast 
diminution in value as an inquiry into the severity of the interference, with a focus on 
the repetitive nature of the interference. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 
522-23; supra note 171 and accompanying text; see also Steven J. Eagle, The Four-
Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601, 630-31, 641-
44 (2014) (discussing the intrusion of the Penn Central framework into physical 
takings analysis). 
 186 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982); see 
also FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987). 
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II. TRADITIONAL COMPLEXITY 
Despite the presence of the Takings Clause in the federal 
Constitution since 1792, state courts generally controlled the 
development of takings jurisprudence prior to the Civil War.187 A 
number of factors explain the state dominance in developing early 
takings jurisprudence. Through much of the eighteenth century, the 
federal government had “very few occasions to apply the takings 
clause.”188 In addition, public use development “was so meager that 
the problem of compensation for land taken or injured by public 
authorities hardly played a significant role in American law.”189 
Further, until the late 1800s, even when the federal government 
needed land, it did not directly exercise eminent domain, choosing 
instead to use state governments as intermediaries to condemn the 
necessary land.190 Eventually, in 1875, the Supreme Court finally 
clarified that the federal government had the power of eminent 
domain.191 Even after that decision, though, the courts relied on the 
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution to protect property 
rights against the action of state governments, until 1897.192 In that 
year, the Supreme Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporated the just compensation principle for purposes of 
evaluating state action, finally allowing federal courts to apply the 
Takings Clause to state governments.193 
In his work The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860, 
Morton Horwitz attributed the slow development of the federal just 
compensation principle to several theories affecting the development 
of the legal and political systems during the early nineteenth 
century.194 According to Horwitz, the antidevelopment theory of 
 
 187 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 
66-108 (1977); James W. Ely, Jr., The Fuller Court and Takings Jurisprudence, 2 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 120, 120-22 (1996) [hereinafter The Fuller Court]. 
 188 GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF 
THE REGULATORY STATE’S ACQUISITION, USE, AND CONTROL OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 13 
(1998); see also Ely, The Fuller Court, supra note 187, at 120 (noting that the federal 
government “instituted relatively few projects that necessitated taking private 
property”). 
 189 HORWITZ, supra note 187, at 63. 
 190 See SKOURAS, supra note 188, at 19. 
 191 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875). 
 192 See SKOURAS, supra note 188, at 13; see also James W. Ely Jr., Whatever Happened 
to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 371, 371-72 (2010). 
 193 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
 194 See HORWITZ, supra note 187, at 32, 63-66. But see SKOURAS, supra note 188, at 
13-14 (criticizing Horwitz’s position). 
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property generally limited landowners to the “natural uses of their 
land,” which often meant agrarian uses.195 “[A]ny interference with 
the property of another gave rise to liability; only the lowest common 
denominator of noninjurious activity could avoid a suit for 
damages.”196 Also, adherents to the republican theory of government 
viewed property owners as holding their rights “at the sufferance of 
the state” for the promotion of the greater public good.197 Although 
republican theorists recognized the importance of property rights, 
they also believed that those rights could be restricted or abridged 
when public health, welfare, or safety concerns needed such 
restriction.198 
During the post–Civil War era, significant changes occurred in the 
social, political, and legal systems of the United States. Over time a 
strong federal government developed, aided in part by the Supreme 
Court’s more active role in the economic and social spheres.199 The 
Supreme Court, for example, began to develop the framework of its 
own takings principles through a series of physical takings cases.200 
That framework included examining the character of the government 
action that resulted in the alleged physical taking, as well as the 
impact of the government action on the use value of the land.201 The 
Court’s consideration of interference with use value was important to 
determining the proximity of the government action to a physical 
appropriation or occupation.202 Though the traditional courts did not 
 
 195 HORWITZ, supra note 187, at 32. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 64. 
 198 See id. at 47-53 (discussing how courts justified the Mills Acts, despite their 
negative impact on neighboring landowners, as promoting society’s economic 
development); id. at 64 (noting that “[a]t the turn of the century, there still existed a 
perhaps dominant body of opinion maintaining that individuals held their property at 
the sufferance of the state”). 
 199 See SKOURAS, supra note 188, at 17-21. 
 200 See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1924) (government 
canal project resulting in flooding); Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 223-24 
(1904) (government earthworks to slow erosion of river banks); United States v. 
Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 468-69 (1903), overruled in part by United States v. Chi., 
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941) (government dam causing 
river to overflow onto adjacent land); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
166, 177-78 (1871) (canal company dam, authorized by state statute, causing river to 
overflow onto adjacent land). 
 201 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 202 See, e.g., Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149-50 (considering the lack of interference 
with use value determinative in concluding that no taking occurred when it was not 
clear to what extent the government canal caused the flooding on the appellant’s land). 
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speak in terms of the exclusion or governance strategies, their factor 
analysis reflected a more flexible approach than one based solely on 
exclusionary thinking.203 A discussion of some of the key physical 
takings cases will illustrate the complexity of the traditional physical 
takings concept — a complexity that has been ignored or forgotten in 
recent years. 
A. Categories of Physical Takings 
For the most part, traditional physical takings cases fall into one of 
three categories: (1) public works projects that cause some sort of 
physical interference with private property; (2) military uses of private 
property; and (3) other public necessity or emergency uses.204 
Collectively, the cases present an approach to physical takings that is 
more flexible and nuanced than the modern one, considering factors 
and dimensions that foreshadow the governance strategy to 
management of property rights. 
1. Public Works Cases 
Many of the public works takings cases involved navigation projects. 
Among other activities, those projects focused on dam construction,205 
improvement of the navigability of waterways,206 construction of 
canals or dikes to control water flow,207 and modification of the flow 
 
 203 See, e.g., Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 181 (“[I]t remains true that where real 
estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other 
material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy 
or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution . . . .”). 
 204 See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153-54 (1921) (public necessity because 
of serious housing crisis); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897) 
(public works project); United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 228-29 (1887) 
(military necessity). 
 205 See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 746 (1947) (government 
dam of Kanawha River in West Virginia caused flooding); United States v. Cress, 243 
U.S. 316, 317-18 (1917), limited by Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 
at 597 (back-water from government dams on the Cumberland and Kentucky Rivers); 
Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 167 (state-authorized, privately constructed dam of the 
Fox and Wisconsin Rivers caused flooding). 
 206 See, e.g., United States v. Kan. City Life Ins., 339 U.S. 799, 800 (1950) (flooding of 
land caused by government’s maintaining a section of the Mississippi River artificially 
high in the interest of navigation); United States v. Willow River Power, Co., 324 U.S. 
499, 500-01 (1945) (government dam built to improve navigation on the Mississippi 
River caused diminution of the capacity of an upstream electric power plant). 
 207 See, e.g., Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 146-47 (government canal built between the 
Calaveras River and the Mormon Slough in California to reduce sediment deposits in 
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of navigable waters.208 The navigation cases proved to be a fruitful area 
for the development of the physical takings concept. Because navigable 
waters were involved, the cases raised questions about the relationship 
between private and public rights in the waters. These questions 
forced the Court to confront the conflicting and complex interests at 
stake, much as the governance strategy would. Many of the cases also 
involved interference with use, destruction of value, temporary 
physical invasions, indirect physical interference, and questions about 
the strength of the link between the physical interference and the 
damage to property rights. The cases thus allowed the Supreme Court 
to build a takings framework that involved some important pieces of 
the takings puzzle — pieces that relate to the distinction between 
takings and torts, to the importance of economic impact in the 
physical takings setting, and to the significance of differences in 
degree versus differences in kind. 
One of the most significant public works cases, Pumpelly v. Green 
Bay Co., involved a government-authorized dam construction project 
that resulted in the overflowing of a lake onto 640 acres of plaintiff’s 
land.209 Although the government did not formally take title to or 
actual possession of the land, the flooding caused by the overflow 
almost totally destroyed the property’s value.210 Despite the absence of 
a formal appropriation of title or possession, the Court concluded that 
the government action constituted a physical taking.211 Critical to the 
Court’s reasoning was the physical invasion of plaintiff’s land by a 
government-induced overflow that made the land almost completely 
unusable.212 As the Court explained, where land is “actually invaded 
by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or 
by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually 
destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking.”213 The Court admitted 
that, as a general matter, the law did not provide just compensation 
for consequential or indirect injury to property resulting from a 
 
the navigable channels); Gibson, 166 U.S. at 269 (government-built dike on Ohio 
River flooded the landing that a farmer used to send produce to market). 
 208 See, e.g., Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 217-18 (1904) (government 
earthworks built to slow the narrowing from erosion of a navigable passage on the 
Mississippi River). 
 209 See Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 167. 
 210 Id. at 177. 
 211 See id. at 181-82. 
 212 See id. at 179. 
 213 Id. at 181. In Pumpelly, the Court actually was interpreting a takings provision 
in the Wisconsin state constitution that was very similar in wording to the federal 
constitutional provision. 
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government undertaking.214 Where, as here, however, a “serious 
interruption to the common and necessary use of property” had 
occurred through flooding from a government project, the 
interruption would be “equivalent to the taking” of it.215 The Court 
noted that: 
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in 
construing a provision of constitutional law, always understood 
to have been adopted for protection and security to the rights 
of the individual as against the government . . . it shall be held 
that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of 
real property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value 
entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury . . . 
without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest 
sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.216 
The fact that the land bordered a navigable waterway and therefore 
was subject to the public’s navigation servitude did not matter to the 
Court.217 
Pumpelly is significant for a number of reasons. First, the Court in 
Pumpelly recognized property as a bundle of rights having value, and 
not just as a physical thing. Although the property owner did not lose 
title or possession by direct appropriation, he still was entitled to 
compensation under the physical takings concept for the near total 
destruction of his right to use the land.218 In Pumpelly, the Court made 
clear that physical takings were not simply about the loss of the right 
to exclude.219 Second, the Court found a physical taking despite the 
absence of a formal or direct appropriation of title or possession by 
government. Under its logic, the Court treated the near total 
destruction of the property’s use value by government-induced 
flooding as functionally equivalent to an official physical occupation 
by government.220 Indirect damages were at least compensable when 
government action led to a permanent physical invasion that deprived 
the owner of the property’s use value. This focus on interference with 
use and destruction of value reveals that the traditional judicial 
narrative of physical takings included a determination of the severity 
 
 214 See id. at 180-81. 
 215 Id. at 179. 
 216 Id. at 177-78. 
 217 See id. at 181-82. 
 218 See id. at 178. 
 219 Id. at 178-79. 
 220 See id. at 181-82. 
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of the deprivation. Finally, the public right of navigation was not 
enough, at least in the context of Pumpelly, to defeat the takings claim. 
The Supreme Court distinguished Pumpelly in the 1878 decision 
Transportation Co. v. Chicago.221 The property owners in 
Transportation Co. had claimed that the City of Chicago’s construction 
of a tunnel under the Chicago River had constituted a taking by 
depriving the property owner of water access to its shipping 
warehouse and street access to some of the warehouse’s doors during 
the construction period.222 In rejecting the takings claims, the Court 
held that “acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, 
and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their 
consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a 
taking.”223 The Court distinguished the case before it from Pumpelly by 
noting that Pumpelly involved “permanent flooding of private 
property” resulting in a “physical invasion” of the land and a 
“practical ouster” of the owner from the land.224 In Transportation Co., 
in contrast, “[n]o entry was made upon the plaintiffs’ lot. All that was 
done was to render for a time its use more inconvenient.”225 Because 
the obstruction of access was not “permanent or unreasonably 
prolonged,” the Court found no taking.226 The temporary nature of the 
obstruction of access in Transportation Co. and the absence of any sort 
of physical invasion — even an indirect one caused by government — 
were critical to the Court’s distinction of the case from Pumpelly. 
Almost twenty years later, in Gibson v. United States, the Court 
followed the distinction made in Transportation Co. to conclude that 
government construction of a dike did not constitute a taking even 
though the dike substantially diminished the functioning of plaintiff’s 
landing, denying the landowner water access for much of the year.227 
The federal government constructed the dike to concentrate the water 
 
 221 See Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878). 
 222 See id. at 636. 
 223 Id. at 642. The just compensation or takings clause in some state constitutions 
includes damage to private property and loss of access. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11 
(stating “[t]hat the General Assembly shall pass no law whereby private property, the 
right to which is fundamental, shall be damaged or taken except for public use”). See 
generally 2A PHILIP NICHOLS ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.02 (3d ed. 2014) 
(discussing takings under federal and state constitutions). 
 224 Transp. Co., 99 U.S. at 642. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at 643. 
 227 See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271, 276 (1897). The landowner had 
water access when water levels were high. Id. at 270. 
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flow of the river as it ran past plaintiff’s property.228 Though the dike 
substantially reduced plaintiff’s water access, the landowner still could 
access the property by land.229 To support its conclusion of no taking, 
the Court stressed that the damage to plaintiff’s property “was not the 
result of the taking of any part of her property . . . or a direct invasion 
thereof, but the incidental consequence of the lawful and proper 
exercise of a governmental power” to improve navigation.230 
Compensation for such damage was not allowed because the losses 
were “accidental, but unavoidable.”231 Only when an “extreme[]” 
situation like that present in Pumpelly existed would the Court be 
willing to find a taking for indirect damages.232 Such a situation 
required a permanent physical invasion induced by government and a 
practical ouster of possession.233 Further, because plaintiff’s land 
bordered a navigable waterway, plaintiff owned the land subject to the 
public’s navigation servitude.234 Damage resulting from the dike 
construction was “merely incidental to the exercise” of this 
servitude.235 The existence of public rights in adjacent navigable 
waters and the government action taken to improve the exercise of 
those rights thus complicated resolution of the takings claim. The 
complex property sharing arrangement in Gibson required a more 
nuanced approach closer to the analysis of the governance strategy 
than the logic of the exclusion-based, per se approach. 
The Court again distinguished Pumpelly in the 1900 decision 
Scranton v. Wheeler.236 In that case, the government authorized 
construction of a pier that would rest on submerged lands and extend, 
in the water, across the front of plaintiff’s land.237 As a result of the 
construction, plaintiff was denied access to navigable water from his 
waterfront property.238 In concluding that the loss of access caused by 
 
 228 Id. at 269. 
 229 Id. at 270-71. 
 230 Id. at 275. 
 231 Id. at 274 (quoting from Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & 
Serg. 101, 115 (Pa. 1843)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 232 Id. at 275-76. 
 233 See id. at 276. 
 234 See id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900). 
 237 Id. at 141. 
 238 Id. at 143-44. The water between the new pier and the bank of the river was only 
five feet deep, so the pier prevented plaintiff “from reaching navigable water of greater 
depth than 5 feet.” Id. at 143. Congress had originally authorized the construction of a 
canal around some falls to connect navigable portions of the river to promote 
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the government construction was not a taking, the Court contrasted 
Pumpelly and followed the consequential damage rule of 
Transportation Co. and Gibson.239 Like the plaintiffs in Transportation 
Co. and Gibson, the landowner in Scranton had suffered consequential 
damages — and not a taking — because the damages did not result 
from a physical appropriation or invasion of plaintiff’s property, but 
rather from the government’s lawful exercise of its power over 
navigable waters.240 That power included the right to occupy the 
submerged bed to improve navigation.241 Because the government 
erected the pier for this purpose, the injury resulted “incidentally from 
the exercise of a governmental power for the benefit of the general 
public,”242 and no compensation was owed. The Court stressed that 
plaintiff’s riparian right of access was always subject to the public 
interest in navigable waters.243 In the Court’s view, “it was not 
intended that the paramount authority of Congress to improve the 
navigation of the public navigable waters of the United States should 
be crippled by compelling the government” to pay compensation for 
injuries incidentally resulting from an improvement ordered by 
Congress.244 Pumpelly did not control because Pumpelly involved 
 
commerce. See id. at 142. Plaintiff’s land had benefitted from that construction and 
from an earlier pier that was further out in the water. See id. at 142-44. 
 239 See id. at 154-57. 
 240 See id. at 164-65. The federal government’s power over navigable waters arises 
from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1, 195-97 (1824); see also TARLOCK, supra note 102, § 9.6, at 535. Public rights in 
navigable waters arise from common law concepts like the public trust doctrine and 
from some state constitutions. See, e.g., Scranton, 179 U.S. at 162-63 (discussing the 
paramount public interest in navigable waters); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-49 
(1894) (recognizing the federal government’s power over navigable waters and the 
navigational servitude imposed on waterfront landowners); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. 
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892) (recognizing the public trust under English 
common law). Property theory scholarship has persuasively justified the recognition 
of public rights in navigable waters. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 
101, at 727-29 (arguing that the public nature of navigable waters has strong historical 
and economic support). 
 241 Scranton, 179 U.S. at 164. 
 242 Id. 
 243 See id. at 162, 164-65. See generally TARLOCK, supra note 102 (discussing the 
relationship between private water rights and public rights in navigable waters); 
Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Property, 9 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 323, 337-40 (1990) (discussing the recognition of public rights under 
the navigability concept). 
 244 Scranton, 179 U.S. at 164-65. 
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permanent flooding of private property caused by a government-
authorized project.245 
A governance strategy for managing interests in navigable waters 
and their submerged lands would more fully reflect the complex 
property sharing arrangement in those resources. This complex 
arrangement recognizes three categories of interests. First, waterfront 
landowners have the right to use navigable waters and their 
submerged beds.246 Second, public rights in navigable waters also exist 
and include navigation, fishing, and other water-related uses.247 Third, 
the federal government has regulatory authority over navigable waters 
under the Commerce Clause.248 Over the years, the federal 
government has repeatedly exercised that power to improve navigation 
and increase commerce. The resulting economic activities have been 
vital to the growth and stability of the country.249 When conflicts have 
arisen between private water rights and the longstanding public 
interest in navigable waters,250 the Court has clarified that the federal 
power over navigation is paramount under the Constitution251 and 
that waterfront landowners take subject to the navigational servitude, 
including efforts to improve it.252 The Court has also clarified that the 
government may not abdicate its responsibility to protect public rights 
in navigable waters.253 Balancing the three categories of interests thus 
requires greater judicial intervention than what normally occurs under 
the exclusion strategy. 
When a resource is subject to a complex property sharing 
arrangement, greater judicial intervention is needed because of the 
numerous stakeholders having interests and gatekeeping powers in the 
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 252 See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1894) (recognizing the 
navigational servitude imposed on waterfront landowners). 
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resources. Increasing returns to scale and expanding economic activity 
occur when the federal government manages navigable waters to 
improve use, control congestion, and overcome self-interested behavior 
that would inhibit cooperation and sharing. Unless such management 
efforts result in an actual physical invasion of private property, claims 
of physical takings normally should be resolved in favor of the public 
rights promoted by the government’s management decision. The Court 
in Scranton reached such a result. Though the loss of access to 
navigable waters might seem significant, the landowner did not lose 
possession or use of the land and could still exercise other water-
dependent uses (such as water withdrawal or fishing).254 Further, the 
government’s earlier water improvements, which included construction 
of a canal around some falls and the original pier, had already 
benefitted the landowner.255 If government could not, without payment 
of compensation, build a larger pier to achieve greater returns to scale, 
the public would have to bear more of the costs of private use even 
when the government action would promote public rights.256 
Application of the exclusion strategy would have focused only on the 
landowner’s loss of access and ignored the public rights. 
In the 1903 decision United States v. Lynah, the Court reaffirmed the 
principle of awarding compensation for damages resulting indirectly 
from government action that physically destroys the use of private 
property.257 In Lynah, a series of dams and other structures built over 
several years to improve navigation on the Savannah River raised the 
mean high water mark of the river.258 This rise in water levels 
damaged a rice plantation, much of which was already located below 
the high water mark.259 The land had been reclaimed by drainage and 
used to grow rice for over seventy years.260 Because of its location 
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below the high water mark, the land periodically flooded as the tides 
rose.261 During those periods, the property owner would open the 
drainage gates to allow the water to recede.262 After the government 
improvements raised the water level near the rice plantation, the land 
no longer could drain and became an “irreclaimable bog, unfit for the 
purpose of rice culture or any other known agriculture, and deprived 
of all value.”263 Relying heavily on Pumpelly, the Court concluded that 
the permanent and total loss of use value caused by government’s 
physical alteration of the river constituted a physical taking.264 As the 
Court explained: “While the government does not directly proceed to 
appropriate the title, yet it takes away the use and value; when that is 
done it is of little consequence in whom the fee may be vested. . . . 
[T]he proceeding must be regarded as an actual appropriation of the 
land . . . .”265 
The decision in Lynah reaffirmed that a physical taking could arise 
indirectly from government action that physically destroyed the use of 
property so long as no damage payment could cure the loss of use 
going forward.266 The total or substantial destruction of use value 
caused by the permanent invasion of floodwater in Lynah “must be 
regarded as an actual appropriation of the land, including the 
possession, the right of possession, and the fee.”267 A “serious 
interruption[] to the common and necessary use of property may 
be . . . equivalent to the taking of it, and . . . it is not necessary that the 
land should be absolutely taken.”268 Lynah thus shows how the logic 
of functional equivalence had become firmly entrenched in the 
physical takings concept. 
The flooding scenario of Lynah seems vaguely similar to the 
situation in the 2012 decision Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, 
discussed earlier. Like the government action in Arkansas Game & 
Fish Commission, government management of navigable waters in 
Lynah led to flooding that destroyed the use value of private 
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property.269 Like the Court in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, the 
Court in Lynah found a physical taking because of that permanent 
destruction.270 On the surface, the public interest in Lynah seems 
stronger because the government action directly promoted the public 
right of navigation, while the government action in Arkansas Game & 
Fish Commission preferred one use over another, destroying the second 
use (farming over timber harvesting). Yet in Lynah, the government 
caused the flooding by permanently altering the physical 
characteristics of the river, raising its actual water level, and taking 
away the affected land’s ability to drain.271 Though the government 
decision in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission to allow deviations in 
water releases did not permanently change the physical conditions of 
the river, the government-authorized deviations altered the character 
of downstream land.272 In both decisions, the government managed 
the watercourse in a way that had lasting impacts on private property. 
In both decisions, the existence of the navigational servitude, by itself, 
did not — and should not — justify management decisions that totally 
destroy use of private property without compensation. Even broad 
gatekeeping powers must respect core conceptual boundaries. 
Just a year after Lynah, the Court in Bedford v. United States limited 
the reach of Lynah and Pumpelly.273 In Bedford, a government project 
to reinforce the banks of the Mississippi River and reduce erosion 
caused water to flood and erode plaintiff’s land.274 The government 
had built a revetment along the banks of the Mississippi after the river 
changed course to prevent further recession away from the City of 
Vicksburg.275 Distinguishing Pumpelly and Lynah, the Bedford Court 
stressed that the “damage was strictly consequential. It was the result 
of the action of the river through a course of years.”276 The Court 
noted that the government was simply trying to prevent or reverse 
erosion caused by natural conditions and was not responsible for the 
initial change in conditions.277 In Lynah and Pumpelly, in contrast, the 
damage was a consequence of government work that altered the 
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natural flow of the water.278 Thus, in refining the distinction between 
indirect, nonrecoverable damages and compensable takings, the Court 
in Bedford clarified that government action constituted a taking when 
it altered natural conditions to improve navigation at the expense of a 
waterfront landowner’s use right but not when it was trying to correct 
or minimize the impact of natural conditions and processes. In the 
alteration situation, government action was the source of the injury, 
resulting in permanent flooding of privately owned land.279 In the 
correction situation, natural conditions and processes caused the 
problem, leading to government’s efforts to rectify the change in 
natural conditions and minimize the impact.280 
This focus on how management or gatekeeping powers over a 
shared resource are exercised could become very important in the 
future as sea level rises and extreme weather events become more 
common.281 In Lynah and Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, the 
management decision created the problem, altering the river 
conditions in Lynah, and creating the conflict between property 
owners in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission. In Bedford, the 
government exercised its management powers to address changing 
natural conditions in an effort to reverse or minimize them. The 
government sacrificed property rights in Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission for one group of private users, and in Lynah for an 
improved navigation channel that irreversibly altered natural 
conditions to the detriment of the landowner. The management 
strategy in Bedford, in contrast, focused on trying to reverse, or at least 
control, naturally occurring change. These differences suggest that 
government efforts to plan for increased flooding events in the future 
should be legitimate if they manage for change — if they focus on the 
changing conditions generally facing waterfront landowners and 
coastal communities. Some management plans may include 
construction of structures to protect coastal communities, while others 
may require retreat from regularly flooded shoreland.282 As long as the 
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government focuses on the changing conditions and does not use its 
management powers to create a conflict between two private users or 
to implement a public program that physically destroys the use of 
property, the management efforts should escape takings liability. 
The Court’s 1917 decision in United States v. Cress283 complicated 
the analysis of how gatekeeping powers are exercised by reaffirming 
and arguably extending Pumpelly and Lynah to allow recovery for 
indirect, consequential injury. Cress involved suits brought by 
landowners to recover compensation for damages to their properties 
resulting from the government’s construction and maintenance of 
locks and dams to facilitate navigation.284 As a result of the project, a 
portion of one property owner’s land became subject to frequent 
overflows that depreciated its value.285 Owners of the other tract lost 
the flow of water needed to operate a mill located on the property.286 
In concluding that the owners of both properties had suffered 
compensable takings, the Court stressed the permanence of the 
changes caused by the government project and the importance of the 
“character of the invasion.”287 As the Court explained, a permanent 
alteration in the physical condition of property could constitute a 
“direct invasion, amounting to a taking,”288 even if it did not cause a 
near total destruction of value, as in Pumpelly and Lynah.289 Rather, 
the “character of the invasion” was the key to finding a taking, not the 
amount of damage or the degree of the destruction of value.290 
In analyzing the character of the government action, the Court 
admitted that the flooding of one plaintiff’s tract was not a “permanent 
condition of continual overflow” but rather “a permanent liability to 
intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows.”291 That did not 
matter, however, because the difference between the two was a 
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difference of “degree” and not a “difference of kind.”292 In principle, 
the right to compensation should arise in both the permanent 
condition and the permanent liability situations.293 In effect, what the 
government appropriated in the case of the intermittent but recurring 
overflows was an “easement . . . to overflow [plaintiff’s land] with 
water as often as [necessarily] may result from the operation of the 
lock and dam for purposes of navigation.”294 While the government 
did not directly appropriate title, it had taken away the use and value 
of the land. Its action therefore had to be treated as an actual 
appropriation.295 For different reasons, government action involving 
the second tract of land also effected a taking.296 Now, the government 
action had taken the “right to have the water flow away from the 
milldam unobstructed, except as in the course of nature.”297 This right 
was not “a mere easement or appurtenance, but exists by the law of 
nature as an inseparable part of the land” because of the ownership of 
the bed of the creek.298 Government’s destruction of the right thus 
caused a “taking of a part of the land.”299 
Many years later, in United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & 
Pacific Railroad Co.,300 the Court limited the reach of both Lynah and 
Cress. In Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., the Court 
considered whether the government owed just compensation to a 
railroad and a telegraph company for injury to their property located 
between the high and low water marks.301 Navigation projects of the 
federal government had raised the level of the adjoining river and 
flooded the companies’ tracks and poles.302 The owners had argued 
that compensation was owed because their property never obstructed 
navigation.303 The government had responded that property below the 
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high water mark is subject to the federal navigation servitude.304 After 
recognizing the constitutional basis of the federal government’s power 
over navigable waters, the Court agreed with the government that this 
power includes all lands below the high water mark, and that damage 
resulting from the lawful exercise of the power generally was not 
compensable.305 To reach its decision, the Court eliminated any 
suggestion in Lynah and Cress that damage to property located below 
the high water mark and caused by alteration of a waterway’s physical 
conditions would be compensable as long as the property did not 
obstruct navigation. The Court in Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & 
Pacific Railroad Co. achieved this by confining Cress to its facts and 
limiting Lynah — a confusing opinion, to the degree that Lynah 
allowed compensation for injury to waterfront property below the 
high water mark.306 The Court clarified that a waterfront landowner 
who built a structure below the high water mark did so subject to the 
“risk that it may be . . . injured or destroyed” by later navigational 
improvements.307 
The decision in Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co. 
makes an important point: first-in-time status does not protect a 
private waterfront landowner who uses land subject to the 
navigational servitude. The rights of waterfront landowners to use 
land below the high water mark do not trump the public interest in 
navigation — not even when exercised first in time. The federal 
government may still make improvements to navigable waters after a 
private structure is built below the high water mark. Being the first to 
exercise rights in a resource subject to a shared property arrangement 
does not give the private user the right to forever hold the public 
hostage. The Court’s decision thus corrects the balance between public 
and private rights in navigable lands and beds — and a more complex 
strategy of governance begins to emerge. Applying a simple strategy of 
exclusion would have focused solely on the physical injury to the 
landowners’ property. 
The Court later contrasted Pumpelly, Lynah, and Cress from the 
dispute in Sanguinetti v. United States308 to distinguish a tort from a 
taking and conclude that no compensation was owed. In Sanguinetti, 
the government constructed a canal to divert waters and improve 
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navigation in an area already prone to periodic flooding.309 The canal 
proved to be insufficient to carry away floodwaters, which overflowed 
onto plaintiff’s property but did not remain long enough to prevent 
use of the land for agricultural purposes.310 In concluding that a taking 
had not resulted from the flooding, the Court stressed the temporary 
and indirect nature of the harm.311 Distinguishing Pumpelly, Lynah, 
and Cress, the Court noted that those cases involved permanent 
overflow situations caused by the government project; Sanguinetti, in 
contrast, concerned temporary overflows and insufficient evidence of a 
causal connection between the government project and the 
overflows.312 To prove the flooding was enough of an invasion to be a 
taking and “not merely an injury to the property,” the landowner 
needed to establish that the overflow was the “direct result” of the 
canal and constituted “an actual, permanent invasion of the land, 
amounting to an appropriation of . . . the property.”313 These 
conditions were not met in Sanguinetti because the extent of the 
increase in flooding caused by the canal was “purely conjectural.”314 
The land would have been flooded even if the canal had not been 
built; the plaintiff had failed to show that the flooding was the “direct 
or necessary” result of the canal.315 Nor had the plaintiff shown that 
the government intended or reasonably anticipated the flooding.316 
Except for short periods of time, plaintiff had not been ousted or 
prevented from conducting his customary use of the land, and only 
temporary flooding and damages had resulted.317 At best, the canal 
caused indirect and consequential damage not compensable under the 
Takings Clause.318 The decision in Sanguinetti thus clarified that 
indirect, temporary damages resulting from flooding and not caused 
directly by a government project were at most a tortious injury, and 
not a physical appropriation under the Takings Clause. 
Much later, the Court qualified the potential reach of Sanguinetti in 
the 2012 decision, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 
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discussed earlier.319 In describing the decision in Sanguinetti, the 
Court in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission stressed that the 
“outcome rested on settled principles of foreseeability and 
causation.”320 Critical to the Court’s reading of Sanguinetti were two 
“case-specific features”: the government had not foreseen or intended 
the flooding and the landowner had not established a causal 
connection between the canal and the flooding.321 Any reference in 
Sanguinetti to the necessity of “an actual, permanent invasion” 
therefore was not, in the 2012 Court’s view, material to that 
decision.322 Further, any interpretation of Sanguinetti as requiring a 
permanent invasion would run contrary to a 1987 decision holding 
that a taking could be temporary in duration.323 
What this reading of Sanguinetti overlooks is the early Court’s efforts 
to place physical takings claims on a continuum to determine whether 
a particular situation was more like a one-time trespass — a tort — or 
instead like a permanent condition or liability — a taking. Implicit in 
these efforts is the recognition of a range of physical invasion 
scenarios that may or may not result in a taking. The degree of 
permanence was critical to the early Court’s thinking. The government 
action in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission was permanent enough 
because the flooding altered the character of the land, detrimentally 
affecting its use.324 The flooding in Sanguinetti, in contrast, did not 
have a lasting impact on the condition or use of the land.325 Though 
the absence of foreseeability and the inability to prove a causal link 
also were part of the Sanguinetti Court’s reasoning, their consideration 
should not detract from the Court’s focus on the degree of 
permanence. 
The tort versus taking distinction proved to be critical to the Court’s 
handling of injuries from a different type of public works project in 
the 1914 decision Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.326 That case 
involved a residential landowner who claimed that smoke, cinders, 
and gases emitted by trains operating on nearby tracks and in a tunnel 
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caused plaintiff’s property to depreciate in value.327 In addition to lost 
rental value, plaintiff claimed that the operation of the railroad on 
adjoining land contaminated the land and air.328 Although the Court 
concluded that the congressional authorization of the railroad’s 
construction and operation had generally “legalize[d] what otherwise 
would be a public nuisance,”329 the Court stressed that the legislature 
could not “confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of such 
a character as to amount in effect to a taking.”330 What this statement 
meant in the context of railroad operations generally was that 
“railroads constructed and operated for the public use, although with 
private capital and for private gain, are not subject to actions in behalf 
of neighboring property owners for the ordinary damages attributable 
to the operation of the railroad, in the absence of negligence.”331 Thus, 
any diminution in value of property that was “not directly invaded nor 
peculiarly affected” would not be a taking as long as the property 
owner was “sharing in the common burden of incidental damages” 
arising from the proper operation of the railroad.332 That is, no taking 
would result if the damages were “naturally and unavoidably” the 
result of the proper operation of the railroad and were “shared 
generally by property owners whose lands lie within range of the 
inconveniences necessarily incident to proximity to a railroad.”333 To 
rule otherwise would, in the Court’s view, “bring the operation of 
railroads to a standstill.”334 
In applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court 
concluded that a distinction needed to be made between damages 
caused by trains operating on tracks adjacent to plaintiff’s property 
and damages caused by railroad operations in the tunnel.335 Injuries 
from trains operating on the tracks resulted naturally and unavoidably 
from the proper operation of the railroad, generally affecting 
landowners in proximity to the railroad, and therefore were not 
compensable under the Takings Clause.336 Injuries from trains 
operating in the tunnel, however, resulted from the railroad’s 
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installation and operation of a fanning system, which forced out 
pollutants through a portal located close to plaintiff’s property.337 The 
Fifth Amendment did not allow the “imposition of so direct and 
peculiar and substantial a burden” on plaintiff’s property without 
payment of just compensation.338 Damages that were “prevent[a]ble” 
at reasonable expense were not necessary for the purpose 
contemplated, and therefore were compensable.339 
Richards provides a good example of how a governance strategy 
should be applied to a constitutional conflict between private property 
rights and a vital public work. Instead of simply examining the 
conflict from the perspective of the private property owner under the 
exclusion strategy, the Court would, as in Richards, recognize the 
complexity of the interests at stake — both the public interest in an 
important mode of commerce and transportation and the private 
rights of the landowner. The Court would, as in Richards, accept the 
rebalancing achieved by Congress in the legislation that legalized what 
might otherwise be a public nuisance to allow the normal operation of 
the railroad. Such a rebalancing generally would be valid under the 
Takings Clause because it reflected the collective sharing of the usual 
and unavoidable burdens of operating a railroad by neighboring 
property owners while allowing society, including the property 
owners, to benefit from this important mode of transportation. The 
rebalancing could not, however, legalize a direct physical invasion or 
impose a peculiar and substantial burden on a particular landowner 
without payment of just compensation. 
The review of the traditional physical takings cases involving public 
works reveals a Court hard at work evaluating each case under its 
functional equivalence analytic. Through its case-by-case approach, 
the Court gradually identified factors important to determining 
whether a situation was essentially equivalent to an actual physical 
appropriation. The degree of permanence, the degree of physicality, 
the existence of a conflicting public right, and the strength of the 
causal link all were critical to the Court’s decision making. Though 
these benchmarks would remain important in the next two categories 
of traditional takings cases, another factor, public necessity, dominates 
much of the Court’s analysis, suggesting that something more was 
occurring — that the Court was developing another dimension and 
instinctively making a governance-like management decision. 
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2. Military Use Cases 
In addition to the public works cases, decisions about military use of 
private property have contributed to the development of the physical 
takings concept. Raising important conflicts between private property 
rights and the national defense, military use cases typically have 
involved one of three situations: private property that is seized and 
pressed into service by the military; the military’s strategic destruction 
of property during war; and the diminution in value of property by 
military use. In the first two categories, the government has physically 
taken over, consumed, or destroyed private property. Yet, that factor is 
not necessarily determinative of the result. In the third category, the 
diminution in value provides the evidence of physical impact, but 
again further evaluation is needed. Collectively the military use cases 
suggest a far more complex analysis than would occur under a 
straightforward exclusion-based, per se approach. 
a. Private Property Pressed into Military Service 
The military use cases involving property pressed into military 
service highlight the tensions that can arise between important 
military needs and constitutionally protected property. One of the 
earliest takings decisions by the Supreme Court, Mitchell v. Harmony, 
examined the lawfulness of the military’s seizure and use of 
property.340 In that case, the military seized the property owner’s 
horses, mules, wagons, and goods to prevent the enemy from 
acquiring the property and to ensure the success of future encounters 
with the enemy.341 In concluding that the military unlawfully seized 
plaintiff’s property, the Court affirmed its adherence to the law of 
necessity but then determined that the required level of necessity did 
not exist in the case before it.342 The Court explained that, under the 
law of necessity, the military could lawfully take possession of private 
property to prevent it from falling into enemy hands if justified by a 
danger that is “immediate and impending, and not remote or 
contingent.”343 The military could even lawfully press property into 
public service “in case of an immediate and pressing danger or urgent 
necessity existing at the time, but not otherwise.”344 As long as an 
impending danger or urgent necessity existed, the taking would be 
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justified, and no trespass would have occurred.345 The necessity or 
emergency gave the military “the right” to take the property.346 
According to the Court, “urgent” meant “not admit[ting] of delay” and 
existed “where the action of the civil authority would be too late in 
providing the means” called for by the occasion.347 Even when the 
government established that an impending danger or urgent necessity 
existed, however, government generally would be “bound to make full 
compensation to the owner” if it seized or destroyed the property.348 
In the case before it, the military had not established the requisite 
level of danger or necessity. The military and the executive branch had 
authorized plaintiff’s commercial activity, and the government had not 
presented any evidence that plaintiff was trading with the enemy.349 
Nor had the defendant established the urgent necessity required to 
justify seizing property for military use without the owner’s consent.350 
The property was taken to support the advance into Mexico, not to 
defend against an ongoing attack.351 The doctrine of necessity did not 
validate the taking of property to “insure the success of any enterprise 
against a public enemy.”352 The military situation also was not “so 
pressing as . . . to admit of delay.”353 General wartime operations or 
long-term needs would not be enough to justify the seizure of private 
property.354 Without immediate necessity, such action would not be a 
justified taking but rather an unlawful trespass, making the defendant 
liable for the value of the property destroyed during use.355 
Subsequent decisions clarified that, in extreme or exceptional 
situations, the government may seize private property due to 
impending public danger or urgent necessity without consent, and 
sometimes even without payment of compensation. Those decisions 
reiterated the principle that a truly immediate public danger — that is, 
an emergency situation too urgent to delay action — justifies the 
seizure or destruction of private property without consent. Though 
the government’s duty to pay compensation generally remains, in 
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certain extraordinary situations, compensation may not even be owed. 
As one Court explained, the “terse language of the Fifth Amendment” 
does not provide a “comprehensive promise that the United States will 
make whole all who suffer from every ravage and burden of war.”356 
One of those decisions, United States v. Russell, stressed both the 
government’s power to seize property without consent and its 
obligation to pay compensation.357 The Court recognized that the just 
compensation requirement is, “except in certain extreme cases . . . a 
condition precedent annexed to the right of the government to deprive 
the owner of his property without his consent.”358 Government thus 
could destroy, seize, or abrogate property without consent or delay “in 
cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of immediate and 
impending public danger.”359 Such extreme occasions could exist, for 
instance, when property is taken during war to prepare defenses at the 
moment of an impending attack, provide food or medicine to a sick 
and hungry army, or transport troops, arms, munitions, or clothing.360 
A seizure of property would be justified as long as the necessity was 
“extreme and imperative,” enabled those in charge “to maintain their 
position or to repel an impending attack,” and could not be addressed 
in a timely manner by other alternative means.361 As a general matter, 
though, the government would still owe full compensation to the 
owner.362 
In Russell, military necessity justified the government’s seizure of 
plaintiff’s steamboats for use in military operations, but not without 
payment of compensation.363 The owner of the steamboat served on 
the ships and paid for operational expenses while the government 
used the steamboats for military transport.364 Eventually the 
government returned the steamboats to the owner’s exclusive 
control.365 Recognizing that “imperative military necessity” justified 
the seizure and use of the property without the owner’s consent, the 
Court concluded that private rights “must give way for the time to the 
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public good, but the government must make full restitution for the 
sacrifice.”366 
The Court in Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States discussed in 
greater detail the idea that some extreme, exceptional circumstances 
would even excuse payment of just compensation.367 As the Court 
noted, “destruction of, or injury to, property is frequently 
accomplished without a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense.”368 
Property may be destroyed without compensation, for example, to 
prevent the spreading of a fire or a contagious disease.369 Further, laws 
could indirectly harm property through regulation, making it “almost 
valueless,” and still escape liability.370 The Court explained that the 
Takings Clause “has always been understood as referring only to a 
direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from 
the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any 
bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to 
individuals.”371 
This rule applied in Omnia Commercial, where the government 
indirectly frustrated the performance of a contract by physically taking 
over property during war.372 In Omnia Commercial, the government 
had requisitioned the entire output of a steel company, causing the 
company to default on its contract with Omnia.373 Although the 
executory contract was “property within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment,”374 the government requisition did not effect a taking of 
Omnia’s contractual interests because the government had not directly 
seized either of the two key parts of the contract: the obligation to 
perform and the right to enforce.375 Seizing the subject matter of the 
contract during wartime was a lawful exercise of the police power that 
made the contract between Omnia and the steel company impossible 
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to fulfill. The contract was not directly appropriated but rather 
ended.376 
Instead of attempting to distinguish between direct and indirect 
damage, the Court in Omnia Commercial could have provided a more 
satisfying rationale for the uncompensated taking by focusing on the 
nature of the public necessity. Without sufficient steel, United States 
war efforts would have been seriously disadvantaged, putting more 
troops at risk and increasing the enemy’s ability to prevail. The 
government requisition reflected necessary priorities during the war. 
As Nestor Davidson explained in putting forth a doctrine of economic 
necessity, “vulnerability to this kind of exigency is inherent in the 
obligations of ownership and membership in a community.”377 
For the most part, the cases involving the seizure of private property 
for military service suggest that compensation normally is owed when 
government takes possession of or destroys private property.378 
Further, this principle generally applies even when impending public 
danger or urgent necessity justifies the seizure or destruction. Only a 
few of the military seizure cases affirmatively recognize the possibility 
that exceptional circumstances may justify seizure or appropriation 
without compensation.379 The meaning of those exceptional 
circumstances and of the distinction between noncompensable and 
compensable takings becomes clearer after examining the cases 
involving strategic destruction of private property. 
b. Strategic Destruction of Property 
The cases involving strategic destruction of property by the military 
have played an important role in defining when a compensable taking 
exists. In the 1887 decision United States v. Pacific Railroad, the Court 
established that military necessity justifies the strategic destruction of 
property without payment of compensation.380 In that decision, the 
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Court announced that “no action lies against the state . . . for losses 
which she has occasioned, not wilfully, but through necessity and by 
mere accident, in the exertion of her rights” during times of war.381 All 
property is held subject to being “temporarily occupied, or even 
actually destroyed, in times of great public danger, and when the 
public safety demands it.”382 When the government destroys property 
during “actual and necessary military operations,” the government has 
no obligation to pay compensation to the owner.383 Although the 
Court recognized that compensation had sometimes been allowed, it 
described those cases as a “matter of bounty rather than of strict legal 
right.”384 As the Court explained, the “safety of the state . . . overrides 
all considerations of private loss.”385 Personal injuries and destruction 
of property occurring during war were inevitable consequences of war 
that had to be “borne by the sufferers.”386 If the state had to indemnify 
all who suffered injuries to their property during war, “the public 
finances would soon be exhausted,” creating an “utterly 
impracticable” situation.387 Though these comments were dicta, the 
Court’s forceful and broad language reflects recognition of the 
vulnerability of membership in a society threatened by war.388 
The Court was quick to distinguish cases like Mitchell v. Harmony 
and Russell v. United States that involved private property being 
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pressed into military service.389 The government owed compensation 
in those situations, but not in the strategic destruction cases, because 
the public bore the general costs of engaging in war, as opposed to 
defending against an actual and imminent enemy attack or advance.390 
Through this distinction, the Court was able to both define and limit 
the concept of “necessary military operations.”391 
One of the cases the Supreme Court relied on in developing its no-
compensation rule for strategic destruction of property was an early 
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Respublica v. 
Sparhawk.392 Decided before the Fifth Amendment was ratified, 
Respublica involved the question of whether the capture of private 
property by the enemy, while the property was under government 
care, required compensation.393 Concluding that no compensation was 
owed, the state court recognized that “many things are lawful” during 
times of war “which would not be permitted in a time of peace.”394 
Further, “rights of necessity, form a part of our law.”395 A person, for 
example, could pass through a private gate when a road was in 
disrepair, bulwarks could be built on private property in time of war, 
people traveling on navigable waters could use the banks of the 
waterway to tow barges, and hunters could pursue foxes onto private 
property.396 The state court noted the folly of failing to rely on 
necessity to justify destruction of property by pointing to the Great 
Fire of London in 1666.397 Half of that city burned, according to the 
court, after the Mayor failed to order the destruction of homes to stop 
the fire “for fear he should be answerable for a trespass.”398 The court 
stressed that Congress had the power to direct the removal of property 
 
 389 See supra notes 340–66 and accompanying text. 
 390 See Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. at 239. 
 391 Id. 
 392 Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1788); see also Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. at 234. 
 393 Respublica, 1 Dall. at 362. 
 394 Id. 
 395 Id. 
 396 See id. at 363. 
 397 See id. 
 398 See id. An old English law apparently required a person who pulled down 
another’s house to build it again. According to some accounts, the Mayor of London was 
not willing to destroy houses to stop the fire because of this law. Other accounts, 
however, suggest that Aldermen of the city tried to stop homes from being torn down 
because their houses would be the first to be pulled down. According to one eyewitness, 
the Mayor eventually began pulling down houses hours after the fire started, but it was 
apparently ineffective until the Duke of York took over control of the city. See WALTER 
GEORGE BELL, THE GREAT FIRE OF LONDON IN 1666, at 316 (2d ed. 1920). 
  
1748 University of California, Davis [Vol. 48:1687 
“necessary to the maintenance of the Continental army, or useful to 
the enemy, and in danger of falling into their hands.”399 This authority 
to act is a “natural and necessary incident” of the war powers.400 
In the 1909 decision, Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, the Court 
relied on Pacific Railroad and other cases to conclude that the strategic 
destruction rule includes destruction of the property of American 
citizens located in enemy country.401 In Juragua Iron, plaintiff mined 
iron ore and manufactured iron and steel products.402 Some of its 
business was located in Cuba.403 During the war with Spain, the 
United States ordered troops engaged in military operations in Cuba to 
destroy all places suspected of harboring the yellow fever germ to 
protect the health of the troops.404 Plaintiff’s property was burned as a 
result.405 In rejecting Juragua Iron’s takings claim, the Court described 
plaintiff’s business in Cuba as enemy property subject to the rules of 
war and therefore liable to seizure and confiscation when necessary for 
military purposes.406 Because of this designation as enemy property, 
constitutional protection for property did not apply.407 The Court 
stressed that situations involving strategic destruction of property in 
times of war were different than those involving destruction of 
property in times of peace.408 
The Court also relied on the distinction between strategic 
destruction and seizure of property to conclude, in United States v. 
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., that the Fifth Amendment did not always 
require compensation for the wartime destruction of property having 
strategic value.409 In Caltex, the military destroyed plaintiff’s oil 
facilities as part of an evacuation plan for the Philippines implemented 
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.410 Although the Court 
recognized that decisions like Mitchell v. Harmony and Russell v. United 
States provided support for requiring compensation, the Court also 
noted that “[i]n neither was the Army’s purpose limited, as it was in 
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this case, to the sole objective of destroying property of strategic value 
to prevent the enemy from using it to wage war.”411 Stressing the 
importance of the distinction between strategic destruction and 
seizure, the Court reiterated that “in times of imminent peril — such 
as when fire threatened a whole community — the sovereign could, 
with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of 
many and the lives of many more could be saved.”412 Here, “due to the 
fortunes of war,” the property in Caltex “had become a potential 
weapon of great significance” to the enemy.413 In such a situation, the 
“safety of the state” overrode “all considerations of private loss.”414 
Jim Ely has argued that Caltex’s distinction between strategic 
destruction and property seizure ignores the purpose of the Takings 
Clause to ensure that “the financial burden of implementing public 
policy” is not “unfairly placed on individual property owners but 
shared by the public as a whole through taxation.”415 According to Ely, 
the destruction of the oil facility was “simply a necessary cost of 
conducting the war,” much as the acquisition of property for 
maintenance of the troops.416 Both the positions of the majority and 
Ely have some appeal, and resolution of the matter ultimately should 
turn on the nature of the threat to the community. Because of the 
potentially unlimited power of the military during war, a narrow 
approach that builds in restraints on application of the doctrine of 
military necessity makes more sense in a democracy with strong 
individual rights.417 The Court’s restraints have included requiring an 
immediacy to the threat, a genuine and real emergency distinct from 
the general course of the military campaign, and an urgency that rules 
out waiting for civil action.418 
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The cases involving military seizure and strategic destruction of 
property collectively establish several important principles for 
resolving conflicts between constitutionally protected property and 
military operations. First, the courts view the destruction or 
abrogation of private property as “an extreme exercise of the police 
power” that typically will require payment of just compensation.419 
Although property rights are held subject to regulations adopted to 
promote the public welfare, “total sacrifice negatives altogether the 
right of property”; therefore, the conditions justifying such a demand 
must be carefully reviewed.420 Second, the Supreme Court’s distinction 
between cases involving property pressed into service and property 
strategically destroyed makes clear that extreme circumstances 
occasionally will justify destruction or abrogation of property rights 
even without payment of just compensation.421 If a sovereign faces a 
threat to its very existence or to the health of its people, it may take 
necessary action, including the destruction of private property without 
paying compensation. Part of the obligation of membership in a 
community is vulnerability in times of severe crisis. Finally, a 
comparison of the cases involving property pressed into military 
service and property strategically destroyed shows that the 
compensation question can turn on whether the government action 
involves general military operations or instead an urgent situation 
requiring quick action to protect the sovereign and its people. 
Although seizing private property in the normal course of a military 
campaign typically constitutes a compensable taking, destroying or 
using property to defend against an enemy attack often may not 
require compensation. 
In the next category of military use cases, the physical takings claim 
is tied to an argument based on loss of use and diminution in value. 
Because these cases typically do not involve the affirmative seizure or 
destruction of property, the physical aspect of the takings claim is 
more difficult to see. Reliance on loss of use or diminution in value 
instead provides a means for buttressing and highlighting the impact 
of military action on physical use of property. 
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c. Diminution in Value by Military Use 
Whether the Court accepts diminution in value resulting from 
military use as evidence of physical impact and therefore of a physical 
taking depends on how transitory or permanent the offending military 
use is and how much the military use adversely affects physical use of 
the land. In two cases arising in the early 1900s, for example, the 
Court focused on whether the military uses were too occasional to 
constitute a physical taking.422 In one of those cases, the plaintiffs’ 
land was located near a military installation that had tested its battery 
guns over their land after installation.423 The plaintiffs claimed the test 
firings, combined with the possibility of future firings, significantly 
diminished the value of their property.424 In concluding that no taking 
had resulted, the Court in Peabody v. United States acknowledged that 
“if the government had installed its battery, not simply as a means of 
defense in war, but with the purpose” of firing the battery guns 
“directly across” plaintiffs’ land for practice, “in time of peace . . . 
depriving the owner of its profitable use, the imposition of such a 
servitude would constitute an appropriation of property” requiring 
payment of just compensation.425 But absent proof of intent to repeat 
the test and impose such a servitude, the initial test firings would not 
effect a taking.426 The Court explained that firing the guns shortly after 
their installation for the purpose of testing them did not establish such 
intent.427 “The mere location of a battery . . . [was] not an 
appropriation of the property within the range of its guns.”428 Property 
could not be taken simply because the land was suitable for use as a 
firing range or because apprehension caused diminution in value.429 In 
Peabody the claimants failed to establish the intent to repeat the test.430 
The other decision, Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United 
States, involved the same property.431 This time the takings claim was 
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brought after the government replaced the guns with large coast 
defense guns and fired the replacement guns over plaintiffs’ land.432 
The government had also built a fire control station and service.433 In 
rejecting the position that Peabody controlled the matter, Justice 
Holmes noted that “[e]very successive trespass adds to the force of the 
evidence” of intent to continue to fire at will across plaintiffs’ land.434 
Because the lower court had not addressed whether the government 
intended to use the weapons in the future, the Court remanded the 
matter for further consideration.435 
These cases demonstrate the importance of a permanent physical 
impact to the early Court. Rather than focus solely on the degree of 
diminution in value resulting from a physical act, the early Court 
looked at both the degree of permanence and the degree of physicality 
in evaluating physical takings claims. Because the guns were not being 
used defensively in war, military necessity could not justify the firings, 
and ordinary physical takings analysis controlled. In the next category 
of traditional physical takings cases, the Court considers nonmilitary 
emergency situations that might justify a conclusion that no physical 
taking had occurred, or that no compensation was owed. 
3. Other Public Necessity and Emergency Uses 
The military necessity cases make clear that nonmilitary public 
necessities may also justify the physical takeover or destruction of 
private property without payment of compensation. Omnia 
Commercial Co., for example, discussed how public necessity justified 
destroying property to prevent the spread of fire or disease without 
compensation,436 while Respublica identified a number of situations 
where necessity justified the use or destruction of property, including 
passage through a private gate, pursuit of foxes, and preventing the 
spread of fire.437 In a 1992 decision, the Court referred collectively to 
these possibilities as “or otherwise” examples of legitimate limitations 
on property that severely affect its use or value yet do not require 
compensation.438 In a footnote, the Court then explained that the 
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“principal ‘otherwise’” situation involved “‘cases of actual necessity, to 
prevent the spreading of a fire’ or to forestall other grave threats to the 
lives and property of others.”439 As with the military necessity 
doctrine, uncompensated takings for other public necessities thus are 
allowed when private property likely would have been destroyed 
anyway because of a grave emergency or an “acute collective action 
problem” requires “swift action.”440 The nonmilitary public necessity 
cases also highlight the inherent vulnerability of community members 
to a serious and specific public emergency. A brief review of a few 
public necessity cases shows some of these rationales at play. 
In Block v. Hirsh, the Court upheld a statute limiting a landowner’s 
right to exclude tenants after World War I.441 The law allowed tenants 
in the District of Columbia to remain in a lease after the expiration of 
the lease’s term, provided the tenants met their lease obligations, 
unless the landlord gave thirty days’ notice to reclaim the premises.442 
Effective for two years, the law was adopted in 1919 to deal with the 
housing crisis caused by the war.443 In upholding the law against a 
takings challenge, the Court gave the government considerable 
deference.444 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes explained that 
the “circumstances have clothed the letting of buildings in the District 
of Columbia with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by 
law.”445 According to Justice Holmes, “a public exigency will justify 
the legislature in restricting property rights in land to a certain extent 
without compensation.”446 
Subsequent decisions have clarified that the public exigency in Block 
v. Hirsh was not open-ended or indefinite. In Chastleton Corp. v. 
Sinclair, the Court returned to the statute at issue in Block after 
Congress renewed the act.447 This time, Justice Holmes’s majority 
effectively struck down the law, explaining that the crisis caused by 
the war was over and that price inflation, by itself, was not enough to 
justify the deferential approach taken in Block in evaluating the 
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takings claim.448 The Court again discussed Block in Home Building 
and Loan Association v. Blaisdell.449 The Minnesota statute at issue 
authorized a mortgage foreclosure and sales moratorium in response 
to the Great Depression.450 In upholding the law against a Contract 
Clause challenge, the Court referred to Block on several occasions as 
support for the exercise of expanded police powers to protect vital 
interests during an emergency.451 
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co. involved a different type of 
war-related crisis that raised regulatory, and perhaps even physical, 
takings claims.452 During World War II, the nation experienced a 
critical shortage of essential metals necessary to the war effort, as well 
as the machines and skilled laborers needed for mining.453 To handle 
the shortages, the government issued a series of orders that prohibited 
the use of mining equipment in nonessential mines and closed down 
gold mines to induce laborers to relocate.454 Owners of gold mines sued 
for compensation, claiming a taking of their right to mine because of 
the government action.455 In rejecting the takings claim, the Court 
stressed that government had not physically occupied the mines or the 
equipment.456 Though the government orders effectively prohibited the 
operation of the mines, “[w]ar, particularly in modern times, demands 
the strict regulation of nearly all resources. It makes demands which 
otherwise would be insufferable.”457 The losses caused by the wartime 
restrictions were “insignificant when compared to the widespread 
uncompensated loss of life and freedom of action which war 
traditionally demands.”458 Because the damage to the gold mine owners 
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was incidental to the lawful regulation of matters “essential to the war 
effort,” the majority concluded that no compensation was owed.459 
Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion bridges both physical and 
regulatory takings cases. In his dissent, Justice Harlan explained how 
he found persuasive the Court of Claims finding that the “dominant” 
reason for the closure was the relocation of gold miners to essential 
mining operations.460 The wartime order shutting down the mines was 
not simply a regulation causing incidental loss, but rather a temporary 
taking of the right to mine gold.461 Because of the order, owners were 
deprived of all beneficial and profitable use of the mines.462 As a 
practical matter, the government action had the same consequences as 
the “temporary acquisition of physical possession” of the mines.463 
Resolution of the case should not, in Harlan’s view, turn on whether 
government physically entered the mines, “planting the American flag 
on the mining premises.”464 Labeling the government action 
“confiscatory,” Justice Harlan ruled out applicability of the cases 
dealing with wartime regulation of prices, rents, and profits in part 
because they dealt with a “nationwide regulatory system,” not “a 
narrowly confined order directed to a small, singled-out category of 
individual concerns.”465 Wartime regulations that touched everyone to 
some degree were different than action putting the government in a 
position equivalent to an outright physical seizure of property.466 
Justice Harlan’s analysis harkens back to the equivalence logic used in 
the public works cases,467 and illustrates how physical takings analysis 
generated the regulatory takings doctrine. Though some may view his 
analysis and the Court’s decision solely as a regulatory taking case,468 
the similarities between his logic and the traditional physical takings 
cases demonstrate the complexity of the physical takings concept and 
the need for a governance strategy for multi-faceted disputes. 
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In National Board of YMCA v. United States, riots in Panama led to 
the destruction of private property despite the military’s efforts to 
protect the property.469 Noting the “unusual circumstances” 
surrounding the property’s destruction, the Court rejected the takings 
claim of the property owner.470 Though the troops had temporarily 
occupied the buildings “in the course of battle,” this action did not 
deprive the owner of any use that could have occurred.471 Trying to 
protect a building by occupying it is no different than “entry by 
firemen upon burning premises.”472 Compensation is not owed “every 
time violence aimed against government officers damages private 
property.”473 
Like the earlier military necessity cases, these decisions instinctively 
recognize the need for a governance approach to delineating rights and 
managing societal resources when imminent public exigencies exist. 
The Court’s references to property “clothed with a public interest” in 
situations involving defined public crises indicate that a simpler, 
exclusion strategy was not being used. The exclusion strategy 
measures only the impact of the government act on the private 
property owner, focusing on the degree of permanence and physicality 
of the act.474 This two-dimensional analysis does not adequately 
capture or address the public crisis. The two-dimensional approach 
works well with simple property situations. If, for example, someone 
buys a pizza, government generally cannot seize the pizza without 
repercussions, absent a true necessity justification. It would be wrong 
though, to generalize from this simple property arrangement to other 
more complicated ones. The simple property picture does not involve 
a public good, a necessity situation, or a property sharing arrangement 
of any sort. With more complicated property arrangements, greater 
 
 469 Nat’l Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 87 (1969). 
 470 Id. at 93. 
 471 Id.  
 472 See id. 
 473 Id. 
 474 The strength of the causal link between the government act and the damage to 
the property owner also is important but appears to be influenced by the other two 
factors. That is, the more permanent or physical the government action, the more 
likely a sufficient causal link exists. A case that involves a one-time physical or 
nontrespassory invasion would not have the necessary intent to repeat to move it from 
a single trespass to indefinite or permanent interference (e.g., Peabody). A case that 
involves a law limiting rights important to possession and use would turn on evidence 
of physical impact on use (e.g., rent control cases), the voluntariness of the affected 
private transaction (e.g., rent and rate regulation cases), or the existence of physical 
change (e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n and Lynah). 
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judicial intervention is needed to resolve conflicts — for example, to 
determine whether the public necessity is compelling enough to justify 
the government action without compensation. The governance 
strategy recognizes and calls for such intervention. The next Subpart 
discusses how the governance strategy helps to define the reach of 
constitutionally protected property as the complexity of property 
arrangements increases. 
B. The Governance Function of Constitutional Property 
The early physical invasion cases involving public works provided 
much of the foundation for the development of modern takings law. In 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., the Supreme Court announced that it was 
not going to define a taking “in the narrowest sense”;475 it was not 
going to look simply at whether the government had converted the 
property to public use, but rather at whether the government-
authorized public work inflicted irreparable and permanent injury, 
totally destroyed the value of property, or otherwise subjected the 
property to “total destruction.”476 Early on, in other words, the Court 
adopted a functional equivalence test for analyzing physical takings 
claims and did not simply ask whether a physical invasion existed. 
Using this functional equivalence test, the Court established that a 
physical taking could occur even though the government-authorized 
project did not involve an actual, direct physical occupation or 
appropriation of private property.477 Not all of the public works cases, 
however, resulted in a takings finding. To determine whether a public 
works project produced a physical taking, the Court applied a number 
of factors to measure how close the government interference was to an 
actual, direct physical occupation or appropriation.478 These 
proximity479 factors included entry, practical ouster, loss or 
destruction of use, intent to repeat, and destruction of value.480 Early 
 
 475 See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871). 
 476 See id. 
 477 See id. at 180. 
 478 See id. at 177-78. 
 479 Professors Merrill and Smith use this term in the teachers’ manual to their 
casebook in discussing various common law property concepts. See THOMAS W. 
MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, TEACHER’S MANUAL TO PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
40, 52 (2d. ed., 2012) (“One way to help . . . is to describe the question in terms of a 
series of possible proximity rules. . . . One can again construct a proximity line to try 
to capture the dispute over first possession.”). 
 480 See, e.g., Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 
330 (1922) (finding a sufficient basis for a takings claim where “the United States has 
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on, then, the Court’s takings cases reflected an effort to place each 
alleged physical taking on a continuum. 
One often overlooked aspect of the early physical takings cases 
concerns the way the physical invasion or alteration was linked to 
economic impact. Although the early Court stated that the amount of 
damages or the degree of diminution of value was not determinative in 
physical takings cases,481 the Court frequently explained the physical 
taking concept in the context of the relationship between physical 
impact and loss of value.482 Indeed, in some public works cases, the 
Court clearly stated that destroying the use and value of land through a 
physical invasion or physical alteration was a taking.483 The Court also 
stressed that a “serious interruption to the common and necessary use” 
of property was functionally equivalent to a taking.484 The introduction 
of the economic impact perspective in the early physical takings cases 
eventually would have great significance in takings law.485 
The factors used by the traditional Court to detect physical takings 
provide a basis for identifying two key dimensions important to the 
Court’s physical takings analysis. Assuming sufficient causality exists 
between the government act and the harm to the property owner,486 all 
 
set up heavy coast defence guns with the [arguable] intention of [repeatedly] firing 
them over the claimants’ land and without the intent or ability to fire them except 
over that land”); Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 177-80 (“[W]here real estate is 
actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or 
by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its 
usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution . . . .”). 
 481 See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917), limited by United States v. 
Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941). 
 482 E.g., id. at 327-28. 
 483 See, e.g., id. at 328 (concluding that a government project leading to “a 
permanent liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows” constituted a 
physical taking of the use and value of the property). 
 484 Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 179. 
 485 Eventually, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Court would separate the 
economic impact inquiry and make it the basis of the regulatory takings concept. See 
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); supra notes 39–42 and 
accompanying text (discussing the impact of the diminution in value factor in 
physical and regulatory takings). 
 486 In examining the takings causal connection between the government act and 
the injury to private property, the Court has asked whether the government action 
directly caused the injury and whether the injury was peculiar to the property owner. 
Traditional courts distinguished between direct damages and consequential damages, 
denying compensation for the incidental or consequential damages that naturally and 
unavoidably arose from the proper operation of the project and that were shared 
generally by the public. See, e.g., Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 554 
(1914) (declaring that “the constitutional inhibition against the taking of private 
  
2015] The Governance Function of Constitutional Property 1759 
of the factors appear to be measuring the degree of permanence and 
physicality of the alleged government interference. Using these two 
dimensions, the results of physical takings cases can be represented on 
a Cartesian plane with the degree of permanence as the x-axis and the 
degree of physicality as the y-axis. For these two dimensions to 
provide sufficient explanatory and predictive power, the plotted 
results should reveal a relationship between permanence and 
physicality, and show some correlation with the results in physical 
takings cases. Figure 1 depicts the results of such a graphing exercise 
for Supreme Court physical takings cases mentioned in this Article.487 
Each case has been assigned x and y values based on the case’s degrees 
of permanence and physicality as measured by scales adapted from the 
standards and tests of the Court’s physical takings decisions.488 The 
scales and references to some of their sources appear below. 
 
 
property for public use without compensation does not confer a right to compensation 
upon a landowner, no part of whose property has been actually appropriated, and who 
has sustained only those consequential damages that are necessarily incident” to the 
railroad’s operation). Damages that were not the result of a direct invasion but rather 
were incidental, inconveniencing the landowner, were not compensable. See, e.g., 
Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 640 (1878) (“[I]t is inferred, the city is 
responsible to [landowners] for the injurious consequences resulting [from building a 
tunnel]. The answer to this is that the assumption is unwarranted.”). The apparent 
thinking was that to rule otherwise would paralyze government. Consequential 
damages were incidental to the normal operation of important public projects for 
which the public generally bore the burdens and benefits. 
 487 Again, the Supreme Court cases being considered only involve situations where 
the government did not formally condemn private property. Also, while not all of the 
Court’s physical takings cases are considered, the cases are, in the author’s judgment, 
representative of the Court’s decisions in this area. The graph was prepared by 
Matthew Peck, a mathematics and economics major who graduated from the 
University of Virginia in 2014. 
 488 The author coded each case according to these scales and has the table 
reflecting the codes on file. 
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Figure 1. Two-Dimensional View of the Court’s Physical Takings Cases 
• Degree of permanence, moving towards greater permanence with 
ascending values, using the following benchmarks: 
1: One-time trespass or interference489 
2: Interference occurring more than one time but not 
necessarily recurring490 
3: Intermittent and inevitably recurring interference491 
4: Interference for a set period but not necessarily indefinite492 
5: Permanent, indefinite, indirect interference493 
6: Permanent, indefinite, direct interference494 
• Degree of physicality, moving towards greater physicality with 
ascending values, using the following benchmarks: 
1: Economic regulation affecting the right to exclude or use495 
2: Nontrespassory interference affecting use, value, or access496 
3: Continuous passage497 
4: Indirect, unexpected physical invasion or occupation498 
5: Indirect, foreseeable physical invasion or occupation499 
6: Direct, intended physical invasion or occupation500 
 
 
For visual purposes, overlapping points were arbitrarily assigned a 
value of plus or minus .1 to break a tie; any sort of cluster thus 
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 489 See, e.g., Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530, 539-40 (1913) (requiring 
proof of “intention to repeat”). 
 490 See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518-19 
(2012) (focusing on the temporary nature of the flooding).  
 491 See, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917) (finding that “a 
permanent liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows” was only a 
difference in degree from a “permanent condition of continual overflow”), limited by 
United States v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941). 
 492 Compare Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153-55 (1921) (refusing to find a 
physical taking where a law that was effective for two years limited a landlord’s right 
to exclude because of a serious housing shortage due to the war), with Chastleton 
Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1924) (upholding the challenge to an 
extension of the law because the war was over and price inflation was not enough, by 
itself, to justify the deferential approach). 
 493 See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 179 (1871) (noting 
that a permanent and “serious interruption to the common and necessary use of 
property” was “equivalent to the taking of it”).  
 494 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-27 
(1982) (describing the government’s proximate involvement in an “extreme form of a 
permanent physical occupation” as “determinative” of a physical taking claim). 
 495 See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 531 (1992) (concluding that a 
rent control law limiting landlords’ right to evict tenants was not a physical occupation 
because the owners “voluntarily open[ed] their property to occupation by others”). 
 496 Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265-66 (1946) (concluding that 
low-level flights destroying enjoyment and use of the land below were equivalent to 
invasions of the surface even if temporary in duration), with Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 
99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878) (concluding that acts “not directly encroaching” on property 
but “impair[ing]” use by obstructing access were not physical takings). 
 497 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987) (concluding 
that a “permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro” was a permanent physical 
occupation). 
 498 See, e.g., Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 225 (1904) (concluding that an 
attempt to correct and prevent erosion caused by natural conditions was not a 
physical taking even though unexpected flooding and erosion occurred). 
 499 See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 
(2012) (describing the foreseeability of a temporary physical invasion as an important 
factor in evaluating a temporary physical takings claim). 
 500 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) 
(describing a permanent physical occupation as the “most serious form of invasion”). 
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This graphic representation of the Court’s physical takings cases 
reveals some unpredictable results. Though cases with low 
permanence and low physicality values yield no physical taking, as 
expected, other cases receiving the same low score on permanence (2) 
produce a different result depending on their level of physicality (with 
a value of 5 yielding a taking). Similar variation also can be found with 
cases receiving the same low value on physicality (1), resulting in a 
taking only when the level of permanence reaches 6. These results, by 
themselves, are not necessarily troubling, for a high score on either 
dimension could be determinative. Yet, the inconsistencies existing in 
certain clusters of cases suggest otherwise. Instead of the odds of a 
physical taking increasing, as might be expected, with the degree of 
permanence and physicality, the results are mixed. Two of the cases 
receiving values of (6,6), for example, resulted in a physical taking, 
while four did not. Other inconsistent clusters include: the (5,5) 
grouping, where three decisions found a taking and two did not; the 
(5,4) cluster, with one decision finding a taking and two concluding 
otherwise; the (5,2) cluster, with four finding a taking and two finding 
none; and the (3,4.5) grouping, where one found a taking and one did 
not. These inconsistencies suggest that neither dimension is 
determinative or sufficient to describe the physical takings concept, 
despite what the modern Court would like to think. 
What explains the unpredictable clusters and the cases receiving an 
identical low score for one dimension and a varying score for the 
other? For the most part, the divergent results appear to occur in 
situations needing a governance strategy to manage conflicting rights 
and complex property arrangements. Those situations arise when: (1) a 
longstanding public right (for example, the right to navigation) exists 
in a resource also subject to private rights — that is, a resource subject 
to a complex property sharing arrangement; (2) an imminent public 
necessity exists, affecting private property with an overriding public 
interest (whether military or otherwise); (3) a public good (for 
example, highways) or a resource subject to a complex property 
sharing arrangement (such as air or navigable waters) needs extra 
management to handle a problem (for example, flooding or 
congestion); or (4) a technological advance makes a new use possible 
in a resource subject to a complex property sharing arrangement (for 
example, rail or air travel, cable transmission, or drilling for gas in 
shale deposits). 
Results in the cluster of cases having high values for both dimensions 
seem to depend on whether the decisions involve at least one of these 
“governance” situations. In the (6,6) cluster, the four cases finding no 
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physical taking all were military necessity cases,501 while the two 
concluding otherwise did not involve any type of public necessity 
situation.502 Similarly, in the (5,5) cluster, one of the two cases finding 
no physical taking involved the longstanding navigational servitude,503 
and the other involved a technological advance having generalized 
spillovers (the railroad).504 Though one of the other three cases in the 
(5,5) cluster to find a physical taking also dealt with an improvement to 
navigable waters, the improvement went too far by permanently 
flooding and destroying private property.505 In the (5,4) cluster, the two 
cases with no physical taking involved either a serious public safety 
issue506 or a problem with a resource subject to a complex property 
sharing arrangement that needed extra management.507 Similar 
observations describe the “no physical taking” cases in the (5,2) cluster 
(the navigational servitude)508 and in the (3,4.5) cluster (extra 
 
 501 See United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 150 (1952); Omnia 
Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1923); Juragua Iron Co. v. 
United States, 212 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1909); United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 
228-29 (1887). 
 502 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421-25; Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 41-42 
(1960). Loretto, however, arguably involves a complex property sharing arrangement, 
because of the landlord-tenant relationship, as well as the existence of a technological 
advance, the delivery of information and news by cable. 
 503 United States v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 595-
97 (1941). 
 504 Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 553-54 (1914) (concluding that 
normal operation of the railroad generally inconvenienced all surrounding property 
owners). The Court, however, upheld the property owner’s second claim of physical 
takings for damage from the railroad’s tunnel operation because of the “direct and 
peculiar” burden imposed on the landowner. Id. at 556-57. This part of the decision is 
included as one of the three decisions in the (5,5) cluster that found a taking. 
 505 United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 746-47, 751 (1947) (concluding that 
a physical taking resulted when government construction of a dam led to permanent 
flooding of private property). The other two cases in the (5,5) cluster to find a 
physical taking were United States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 800-04 
(1950) (concluding that a government project that improved navigation by raising the 
water level to the high water mark was a physical taking because it prevented drainage 
of waterfront land and destroyed its agricultural value), and Richards, 233 U.S. at 556-
57 (finding a physical taking for the second claim due to damage to private property 
from the railroad’s operation of the tunnel). 
 506 Nat’l Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1969). 
 507 Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 225 (1904). The one case to find a 
physical taking was Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 175-77 (1871) 
(concluding that flooding of waterfront property caused by the government’s 
construction of a dam was a physical taking). 
 508 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 500-01, 511 (1945); 
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 164-65 (1900). The four decisions in the (5,2) 
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management of a resource subject to a complex property sharing 
arrangement).509 In the “low-score anomalies,” five of the six cases with 
no physical taking involved one or more of the following: private 
property opened to the public (and thus subject to a complex sharing of 
sorts),510 promotion of the navigational servitude,511 extra management 
of a resource subject to a complex property sharing arrangement,512 
provision of public utilities,513 or public necessity.514 Only one case that 
did not find a physical taking failed to fit within these categories,515 
though an argument can be made that leasehold property is subject to a 
complex property sharing arrangement and sometimes needs a 
governance approach to managing the overlapping interests. 
Analyzing physical takings cases under the management function of 
property — using both the governance and the exclusion strategies — 
adds a much-needed dimension. Physical takings should not be 
divorced from the underlying property concept.516 The complexity of 
 
cluster concluding that a physical taking had occurred or was possible were: Griggs v. 
Allegheny Cnty., 369 U.S. 84, 88-90 (1962) (concluding that government-authorized 
low-level flights were a physical taking of the private property adversely affected by 
the flights); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-63 (1946) (concluding that a 
physical taking resulted from government-authorized low-level flights); Portsmouth 
Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 330 (1922) (concluding that 
the intent to repeat test firings of military guns over private property could establish a 
physical taking); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917) (concluding that 
permanent alteration of the physical conditions of property by a government 
navigation project could constitute a physical taking), limited by Chi., Milwaukee, St. 
Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. at 597. 
 509 United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 260-64, 270 (1939). The one case 
in the (3,4.5) cluster to find a physical taking was Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 746-47, 751 
(concluding that a physical taking resulted when government construction of a dam 
led to erosion of the banks of waterfront property). 
 510 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77, 88 (1980). 
 511 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 146-47, 150 (1924), limited by Ark. 
Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 520 (2012). 
 512 FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 247-50 (1987); Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 
146-48, 150. 
 513 Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 247-50. 
 514 United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 156-57 (1958); Block 
v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153-54, 158 (1921). 
 515 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 539 (1992). 
 516 See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 24, at 165-66 (agreeing that takings 
analysis needs to consider the nature and concept of property). Laura Underkuffler-
Freund identifies two conceptions of property used in the Court’s takings cases: the 
Apparent model, which conceives of property as protection for individual autonomy; 
and the Operative model, which views property as defining the tension between 
individuals and the collective. Id. at 167-69. In her view both are necessary and do not 
conflict, but rather define different aspects of the property concept. Id. at 193. 
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the property concept will necessarily affect and inform physical 
takings analysis. Our institution of property is not simply about 
allocating rights in resources. It also performs an important and often 
overlooked management function.517 The exclusion and the 
governance strategies help to define the nature of that management 
function by delineating the scope of the rights at stake and prescribing 
different methods of conflict resolution. 
For the most part, the exclusion strategy has dominated the 
discussion and analysis of constitutional and common law property.518 
The logic of the exclusion strategy is appealing and seductive, giving 
primacy to the autonomy interest of the gatekeeper — the property 
owner — and allowing marketplace incentives to influence the owner’s 
decisions. The autonomy interest is critical to the definition of physical 
takings, helping the courts to identify when a physical theft by 
government has occurred. When the government interference involves 
a high degree of permanence and physicality, the logic of the exclusion 
strategy suggests that a physical taking should be found. Yet this 
suggestion does not hold up when a specific public crisis arises or 
when the resource subject to the private property rights is also shared 
by the public or by other private parties. Nor does it hold up when a 
technological advance makes a new use possible and when a public 
good or shared resource is overused, congested, or facing significant 
changing conditions. In these cases, more complex management of the 
resource and the interests in the resource is needed. An approach that 
relies only on the exclusionary perspective does not meet this need. 
Instead, the focus is on private property owners in a vacuum — on 
their interest, on their autonomy, on their decision making power. 
Today, this focus has produced a per se approach that ignores the 
complexity of shared property arrangements, the health of the resource 
being used, and the need for more nuanced management decisions. 
The disconnect between the exclusion strategy captured in the 
physical takings concept through the per se approach and the 
 
 517 In recent years some scholars have explored this overlooked function. Elinor 
Ostrom, for example, examined how different social arrangements led to new 
structures and human organizations for managing property interests and resources. 
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 18-23 (1990) (discussing how institutional arrangements for 
managing common pool resources developed). Robert Ellickson studied how 
community norms led close-knit groups to engage in cooperative behavior to control 
freeriding. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 124-26 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution 
Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 673-76 (1986). 
 518 For further discussion, see Butler, The Resilience, supra note 48, at 856-64. 
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complexity of certain real-life property arrangements becomes 
increasingly apparent as physical takings cases move away from high 
levels of permanence and physicality. The logic of the per se approach 
becomes more and more strained, turning on factors like involuntary 
action,519 some sort of physical presence even if fleeting or 
transitory,520 and temporary invasions changing the character of the 
land.521 Today, the physical takings concept has been stretched so thin 
that it could encompass economic regulations limiting the right to 
exclude,522 a single government trespass inflicting significant 
damage,523 a forced transfer of interest earned on previously non-
interest-bearing funds,524 and even perhaps a permit denial following a 
landowner’s refusal to accept a regulatory condition.525 Eventually, any 
sort of government decision that substantially limits physical use of 
property to manage natural systems, results in physical damage to 
private property due to unexpected natural conditions, or denies a use 
permit after a landowner refuses to meet a proposed condition could 
amount to a physical taking. It is but a small step from the situation in 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission (where the government managed 
water levels to benefit one category of downstream user to the 
detriment of another)526 to a situation where government manages the 
natural systems by making unavoidable choices resulting in physical 
damage for some, but not all, users. It is but a small step from the 
situation in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission to government efforts 
 
 519 FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1987) (stressing how the law 
under review only applied to landlords voluntarily leasing to cable companies). 
 520 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828, 831-32 (1987) 
(describing passage to and fro over the landowner’s property by indiscriminate 
members of the public as sufficient physical presence). 
 521 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 515 (2012) 
(holding that permanent flooding was not a necessary element of a takings claim). 
 522 Constitutional challenges to rent control laws and rate regulations have been 
based, in part, on this argument. See supra notes 122–41 and accompanying text. 
 523 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 518-19 (rejecting a permanence 
requirement in favor of looking at the damage caused by a temporary invasion). 
 524 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003) (describing such 
a forced transfer as similar to a Loretto-type physical invasion). 
 525 The argument would be that the denial deprived the landowner of the right not 
to have property taken for public use without just compensation and therefore is 
equivalent to the forced transfer required by the condition. See Koontz v. St. Johns 
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595-96 (2013) (describing the loss of the 
right to just compensation after a landowner’s refusal to accept a permit condition as 
an “impermissibl[e] burden”). 
 526 See supra notes 155–71 and accompanying text. 
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to manage recurrent flooding and sea level rise by forcing landowners 
to retreat or adapt in ways that limit physical use. 
The governance strategy becomes more important in defining the 
reach of constitutionally protected property as the complexity of the 
property arrangements and the conflicting interests increases. A third-
party manager is tasked with evaluating the conflicting interests and 
defining the scope of the rights in relation to one another and to the 
resource. In many situations, the courts serve this role, exploring the 
complexities of public and private property rights on the ground in 
light of resource conditions, norms, and practices. These are the hard 
cases where the damage to the property owner and the strength of the 
public interests are equally clear: a deliberate breach of a levee in an 
upstream area to protect downstream populations from extraordinary 
flooding, a ban on shoreland development in response to the now 
relentless rise of the sea, an energy company’s mining of shale gas 
deposits forced on a property owner without the benefit of a neutral, 
third-party review. As climate change worsens, as the sea level rises, as 
extreme weather events increase in intensity and frequency, these hard 
cases will become more and more common. The institution of 
property is equipped to deal with hard cases as long as the governance 
strategy becomes part of the calculus — part of the management 
function of common law and constitutional property. 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A MORE NUANCED APPROACH 
A study of the evolution of the physical takings concept provides 
useful lessons for its future development. At the beginning, physical 
takings basically covered direct physical seizures or appropriations of 
private property. Eventually, the concept also included physical 
interference with one of the strands in the bundle of property rights 
(most notably, the right to exclude), as well as indirect physical 
occupation resulting from government-authorized projects (such as 
flooding caused by dam construction). More recently, the concept has 
even included physical invasions of a shared resource that affect the 
use and value of adjoining private property (for example, low-level 
airplane flights), a trespass or temporary invasion changing the 
character of adjacent land (such as temporary water releases flooding 
downstream land), and a forced transfer of interest earned on 
previously non-interest-bearing funds. 
Central to the modern Court’s physical takings concept is a permanent 
physical occupation by government. As the Court has explained, 
permanent physical occupations raise special concerns because of the 
fundamental importance of the right to exclude to private property rights, 
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the loss of all key rights in the occupied property, and the danger that 
government would exploit an individual property owner. For these 
reasons, the Court has declared a permanent physical occupation to be a 
per se physical taking, regardless of the importance of the public interest. 
What this approach ignores is the complexity of many property 
arrangements and of the traditional physical takings concept. Though the 
Court’s earlier decisions likewise applied the exclusion strategy much of 
the time, they also took a more flexible approach that allowed for greater 
responsiveness to real-life settings, using a range of factors to measure the 
impact of a physical act on the property owner. Moreover, older physical 
takings cases considered the public interest at stake, never speaking in the 
language of the governance strategy, but clearly extending their takings 
analysis beyond the two dimensions of permanence and physicality. 
The serious resource problems facing present and future generations 
will require a more nuanced approach than the simple, per se rule of 
modern physical takings jurisprudence. Looking beyond the two 
dimensions of permanence and physicality to analyze physical takings 
claims under the governance management strategy would add a third 
dimension that connects private property rights to actual resource 
conditions and affected public interests. Physical takings analysis 
needs to reflect the key functions of the underlying property concept. 
Modern physical takings cases focus primarily on the allocation 
function and the exclusion strategy, which turns management 
decisions inward. The courts stress the importance of individual 
autonomy and control, leaving out the relationship of the individual 
property owner to other property owners, to collective interests 
represented by government, and to larger natural systems. A 
governance strategy would allow consideration of actual conditions 
and public interests in complex property arrangements where the 
exclusion strategy is not particularly effective or sufficiently 
explanatory. Such a situation at least would arise when a longstanding 
public right exists in a resource also subject to private rights, an 
imminent public crisis develops, a resource subject to a complex 
property sharing arrangement needs extra management, or a 
technological advance makes a new use possible. Under the 
governance dimension, a court could consider the resource conditions 
and public interests in resolving the conflict and managing the 
resource. The governance dimension, in other words, would allow a 
more complete assessment of the ground conditions and management 
needs of complex property arrangements. 
